PREFACE: HANDS UP, DON'T SHOOT!

The intensification of the writing of this book, and the formulation of "the right to maim," its most urgent political theoretical contribution, began the summer of 2014. This was the summer police shot Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, and the summer of Operation Protective Edge, the fifty-one-day Israeli siege of Gaza. Organizers protesting these seemingly disparate events began drawing connections, tracing the material relationships between the Israeli occupation of Palestine and the militarization of police in Ferguson, from the training of U.S. law enforcement by the Israeli state to the tweeting of advice from Palestinians on how to alleviate tear gas exposure. Descriptions of the militarized containment of civilians in Ferguson echoed those of the settler colonial occupation of Palestine. It was not long before the "Ferguson to Gaza" frame starting taking hold as an organizing rubric. Ferguson-to-Gaza forums sought to correlate the production of settler space, the vulnerability and degradation of black and brown bodies, the demands for justice through transnational solidarities, and the entangled workings of settler colonialism in the United States and Israel. The comparisons, linkages, and affective resonances between Ferguson and Gaza were not perfectly aligned, and they did not always yield immediate alliances. But these efforts were convivial in their mutual resistance to the violent control of populations via targeted bodily assaults, and reflected desires for reciprocating, intersectional, and co-constituted assemblages of solidarity.

One striking aspect of the connective tissue between Ferguson and Gaza involved security practices mining the relationship between disability and death. Police brutality in the United States toward black men and women in particular showed a definitive tendency to aim for death, often shooting numerous bullets into an unarmed, subjugated, and yet supposedly threatening body—overkill, some might call it. Why were there seemingly so

few attempts to minimize the loss of life? The U.S. security state enacted powerful sovereign entitlements even as it simultaneously claimed tremendous vulnerability. The police were merely "doing their job," a dangerous, life-threatening one. This calculation of risk is the founding rationalization for the impunity of "the right to kill" wielded by U.S. law enforcement.

The might of Israel's military—one of the most powerful in the world—is built upon the claim of an unchanging ontological vulnerability and precarity, driven by history, geopolitics, and geography. Alongside the "right to kill," I noted a complementary logic long present in Israeli tactical calculations of settler colonial rule—that of creating injury and maintaining Palestinian populations as perpetually debilitated, and yet alive, in order to control them. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) have shown a demonstrable pattern over decades of sparing life, of shooting to maim rather than to kill. This is ostensibly a humanitarian practice, leaving many civilians "permanently disabled" in an occupied territory of destroyed hospitals, rationed medical supplies, and scarce resources. This pattern appeared again during Operation Protective Edge; the number of civilian casualties was reported daily and justified through the logic of collateral damage, while the number of injuries was rarely commented upon and never included in reflections of the daily toll of the siege.

Shooting to maim in order not to kill might appear as minor relief given the proclivity to shoot to kill. Why indeed were so many unarmed black victims of police brutality riddled with scores of bullets? But oscillations between the right to kill and the right to maim are hardly haphazard or arbitrary. The purportedly humanitarian practice of sparing death by shooting to maim has its biopolitical stakes not through the right to life, or even letting live, but rather through the logic of "will not let die." Both are part of the deliberate debilitation of a population—whether through the sovereign right to kill or its covert attendant, the right to maim—and are key elements in the racializing biopolitical logic of security. Both are mobilized to make power visible on the body. Slated for death or slated for debilitation—both are forms of the racialization of individuals and populations that liberal (disability) rights frameworks, advocating for social accommodation, access, acceptance, pride, and empowerment, are unable to account for, much less disrupt.

Fast-forward to the summer of 2016. July 10, 2016, was the fourth day of Black Lives Matter protests going on in New York City, as well as in many other locations across the United States. During the previous week,

the police shootings of Philando Castile in St. Paul, Minnesota, and Alton Sterling in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, had galvanized protests all around the country. The shooting and killing of five police officers during a Black Lives Matter rally in Dallas had only amplified the lines of battle between civilians and law enforcement. The June 12 shooting in an Orlando queer club magnified a homonationalist discourse that posits Muslim homophobes as the primary danger to queer liberals of all colors, resulting in increased policing of LGBTQ pride events during the summer. Bombings by ISIS in the previous month had targeted Nice, Istanbul, and Dhaka. Protesters started gathering at Standing Rock to fight the Dakota Access Pipeline. There were more shootings of black bodies to come.

On this particular day, the main Black Lives Matter protest in New York City was happening in Times Square. Not far from this location, the Second Annual Disability Pride parade, marketed as a festival and celebration, was marching on Broadway from Union Square to Madison Square Park. International in scope, the parade included veterans and actors involved in the development of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. I was in a part of Manhattan equidistant from both activities, one being an action and the other being an event. The relationship between the two confounded me. I recalled that on June 24, Black Lives Matter withdrew from the San Francisco Pride Parade, citing fear of increased police presence in the parade post-Orlando. On July 3, Black Lives Matter, selected as the Toronto Pride Parade's Honored Group, brought the parade to a complete halt in order to demand a series of conditions, including banning police from marching in the parade. I was struck by the discord between an increasingly visible disability empowerment discourse in human rights platforms, cultural productions, and public discourse, and the divestment of Black Lives Matter from narratives of pride, with dominant messaging at Black Lives Matter actions including: "Hands up, don't shoot!" and "I can't breathe!" I remained in the middle, perplexed. This is not an either/or situation, but neither is it resolved by the commonsense logic of both/and. Disability empowerment and pride are part of rights discourses even as expressions of maiming, debilitation, and disabling are central to economies and vocabularies of violence and exploitation.

What kinds of biopolitical fissures produce a spectacle of disability empowerment and pride mere blocks from a movement protesting the targeted debilitation of an entire racialized population, contesting the production



FIG. PREF.1. Peoples Power Assemblies providing powerful counternarratives at the NYC Disability Pride March, July 10, 2016.

of disability that is central to state securitization practices? The New York City branch of the Peoples Power Assemblies (PPA), a part of the Movement for Black Lives, organizes a presence yearly at the Disability Pride March. Participants carry Black Disabled Lives Matter banners, signs that say "Stop the War on Black America" and "Support the Black Lives Matter Movement," and placards noting that more than 50 percent of police shootings of black bodies involve individuals with disabilities. It is a direct action rather than a pride celebration, one demanding attention to both targeting of the disabled and targeting to disable, with distinctly different terms from empowerment and pride rhetorics. As PPA member Colin Ashley put it, "Those on the sidelines either get it automatically and really cheer, or seem completely mystified as to why we would be in the march. We feel it is necessary to go in order to disrupt the normative messaging."[1] For its part, Black Lives Matter has been clear that people with disabilities are both survivors of injustice and also part of their assembly. Alicia Garcia writes that "Black Lives Matter affirms the lives of Black queer and trans folks, disabled folks, Black-undocumented folks, folks with records, women, and all Black lives along the gender spectrum. It centers those that have been marginalized within Black liberation movements. It is a tactic to (re)build



FIG. PREF.2. The location where Jamar Clark was killed by Minneapolis police on November 15, 2015, following the March 29, 2016, decision by Hennepin County attorney Mike Freeman not to charge the officers involved in the shooting. Photo by Tony Webster.

the Black liberation movement."[2] And yet, the Movement for Black Lives received important feedback, specifically from the Harriet Tubman Collective, "A Collective of Black Deaf & Black Disabled organizers, community builders, activists, dreamers, lovers striving for radical inclusion and collective liberation," about the absence of any acknowledgment of or discussion about the impact of disability in black communities in their six-point platform released in August 2016.[3] The intervention from the Harriet Tubman Collective not only highlights ableist frameworks of resistance; it also raises questions about how, in this time of political upheaval and dissent, meetings, protests, and actions could become more accessible to people with varying debilities, capacities, and disabilities.

Today the solidarity pathways between Black Lives Matter and Free Palestine are rhizomatic and bountiful.[4] Pro-Palestinian antiwar activists will join PPA next year, protesting both the targeting of disabled Palestinians by the IDF and the targeting to debilitate, part of a biopolitics not of disability alone but a biopolitics of debilitation. I contend that the term "debilitation" is distinct from the term "disablement" because it foregrounds the

slow wearing down of populations instead of the event of becoming disabled. While the latter concept creates and hinges on a narrative of before and after for individuals who will eventually be identified as disabled, the former comprehends those bodies that are sustained in a perpetual state of debilitation precisely through foreclosing the social, cultural, and political translation to disability. It is this tension, the tension between *targeting the disabled* and *targeting to debilitate*, the tension between being and becoming, this is the understated alliance that I push in this project. The first presumes a legitimate identification with disability that is manifest through state, market, and institutional recognition, if not subjective position: I call myself disabled. But this cannot be the end of the story, because what counts as a disability is already overdetermined by "white fragility" on one side and the racialization of bodies that are expected to endure pain, suffering, and injury on the other.[5] As such, the latter is an understanding of biopolitical risk: to extrapolate a bit from Claudia Rankine's prose: "I am in death's position."[6] And to expand: I am in debility's position.

The biopolitics of debilitation is not intended to advocate a facile democratization of disability, as if to rehash the familiar cant that tells us we will all be disabled if we live long enough. In fact, depending on where we live, what resources we have, what traumas we have endured, what color our skin is, what access we have to clean water, air, and decent food, what type of health care we have, what kind of work we do . . . we will not all be disabled. Some of us will simply not live long enough, embedded in a distribution of risk already factored into the calculus of debilitation. Death's position. Others, at risk because of seeming risky, may encounter disability in ways that compound the debilitating effects of biopolitics.

DEBILITY, CAPACITY, DISABILITY

Disability is not a fixed state or attribute but exists in relation to assemblages of capacity and debility, modulated across historical time, geopolitical space, institutional mandates, and discursive regimes. The globalization of disability as an identity through human rights discourses contributes to a standardization of bodily usefulness and uselessness that discounts not only the specificity of location but also the ways bodies exceed or defy identities and subjects. The non-disabled/disabled binary traverses social, geographic, and political spaces. The distinctions or parameters between disabled and non-disabled bodies shift historically, as designations between productivity, vagrancy, deviancy, illness, and labor market relations have undergone transformations from subsistence work to waged labor to hypercapitalist modes of surplus accumulation and neoliberal subject formation. They shift geographically, as varied cultural, regional, and national conceptualizations of bodily habitations and metaphysics inhabit corporeal relations differently and sometimes irreconcilably, and issues of environmental racism are prominent. They shift infrastructurally, as a wheelchair-accessible elevator becomes a completely altered vehicle of mobility, one that masks various capacities to climb stairs, in many parts of the world where power outages are a daily, if not hourly, occurrence. They shift legally, administratively, and legislatively, as rights-bearing subjects are formed and dismantled in response to health care and insurance regimes, human rights discourses, economic opportunism, and the uneven distribution of resources, medical supplies, and basic care. They shift scientifically, as prosthetic technologies of capacity, from wheelchairs to cell phones to DNA testing to steroids, script and rescript what a body can, could, or should do. And they shift representationally, as discourses of multicultural diversity and plurality absorb "difference" into regimes of visibility that then reorganize sites of marginalization into subjects of privilege, indeed privileged disabled subjects.

In *The Right to Maim: Debility, Capacity, Disability*, I think through how and why bodies are perceived as debilitated, capacitated, or often simultaneously both. I mobilize the term "debility" as a needed disruption (but also expose it as a collaborator) of the category of disability and as a triangulation of the ability/disability binary, noting that while some bodies may not be recognized as or identify as disabled, they may well be debilitated, in part by being foreclosed access to legibility and resources as disabled. Relatedly, some bodies may well be disabled but also capacitated. I want to be clear here: I am not diluting or diffusing the identity rubrics of disability by suggesting all bodies are disabled to some extent or another, or by smoothing disability into a continuum of debility and capacity. Quite the opposite; I am arguing that the three vectors, capacity, debility, and disability, exist in a mutually reinforcing constellation, are often overlapping or coexistent, and that debilitation is a necessary component that both exposes and sutures the non-disabled/disabled binary. As Christina Crosby rightly points out, "The challenge is to represent the ways in which disability is articulated with debility, without having one disappear into the other."[7] I would add that the biopolitical management of disability entails that the visibility

and social acceptance of disability rely on and engender the obfuscation and in fact deeper proliferation of debility.

In her work on bodily impaired miners in Botswana who do not necessarily articulate their plight in relation to disability, Julie Livingston uses the term "debility," defined broadly to encompass "experiences of chronic illness and senescence, as well as disability per se."[8] She demonstrates that historically many bodily infirmities "were not regarded as disabilities: indeed they were 'normal' and in some cases even expected impairments."[9] I take up Livingston's intervention with an important refinement: debility in my usage is not meant to encompass disability. Rather, I mobilize debility as a connective tissue to illuminate the possibilities and limits of disability imaginaries and economies. Debilitation as a normal consequence of laboring, as an "expected impairment," is not a flattening of disability; rather, this framing exposes the violence of what constitutes "a normal consequence." The category of disability is instrumentalized by state discourses of inclusion not only to obscure forms of debility but also to actually produce debility and sustain its proliferation. In a literal sense, caretakers of people with disabilities often come from chronically disenfranchised populations that endure debilities themselves. Conceptually, state, medical, and other forms of recognition of disability may shroud debilities and forms of slow death while also effacing the quotidian modalities of wide-scale debilitation so prevalent due to capitalist exploitation and imperialist expansion. In my usage, debility signals precisely the temporospatial frame eclipsed by toggling between exceptionalizing disability and exceptional disability: the endemic. Relational forms of capitalism, care, and racialization inform an assemblage of disability to a constellation of debilities and capacities. If, in one definition, disability becomes a privileged category by virtue of state recognition,[10] another definition of disability may well be that body or that subject that can aspire both economically and emotionally to wellness, empowerment, and pride through the exceptionalized status it accrues while embedded within unexceptional and, in fact endemic, debility. The compounding of disability and poverty as a field of debilitation is certainly happening in the era of Donald Trump, whose efforts to completely eliminate any whiff of socialized medicine are only really remarkable because they definitively expose the actual scale of disregard for human life, having blown so far open so quickly. Access to health care may well become the defining factor in one's relationship to the non-disabled/disabled dichotomy.

Debility is thus a crucial complication of the neoliberal transit of disability rights. Debility addresses injury and bodily exclusion that are endemic rather than epidemic or exceptional, and reflects a need for rethinking overarching structures of working, schooling, and living rather than relying on rights frames to provide accommodationist solutions. Challenging liberal disability rights frames, debility not only elucidates what is left out of disability imaginaries and rights politics; it also illuminates the constitutive absences necessary for capacitating discourses of disability empowerment, pride, visibility, and inclusion to take shape. Thus, I argue, disability and debility are not at odds with each other. Rather, they are necessary supplements in an economy of injury that claims and promotes disability empowerment at the same time that it maintains the precarity of certain bodies and populations precisely through making them available for maiming.

In a context whereby four-fifths of the world's people with disabilities are located in what was once hailed as the "global south," liberal interventions are invariably infused with certitude that disability should be reclaimed as a valuable difference—the difference of the Other—through rights, visibility, and empowerment discourses—rather than addressing how much debilitation is caused by global injustice and the war machines of colonialism, occupation, and U.S. imperialism. Assemblages of disability, capacity, and debility are elements of the biopolitical control of populations that foreground risk, prognosis, life chances, settler colonialism, war impairment, and capitalist exploitation. My analysis centralizes disability rights as a capacitating frame that recognizes some disabilities at the expense of other disabilities that do not fit the respectability and empowerment models of disability progress—what David Mitchell and Sharon Snyder term the "biopolitics of disability."[11] But the normalization of disability as an empowered status purportedly recognized by the state is not contradicted by, but rather is produced through, the creation and sustaining of debilitation on a mass scale. Debilitation is not a by-product of the operation of biopolitics but an intended result, functioning both as a disruption of the non-disabled/disabled binary—as an in-between space—and as a supplement to disability, that which shadows and often overlaps with disability. I therefore do not offer debility as an identity; it is instead a form of massification. My alternative conceptualization of the biopolitics of debilitation not only refers to the remaindering of what the liberal inclusion of disability fails to fully embrace, but also points to the forms of violent debilitation of

those whose inevitable injuring is assumed by racial capitalism. I therefore seek to connect disability, usually routed through a conceptual frame of identification, and debilitation, a practice of rendering populations available for statistically likely injury.

WHY BIOPOLITICS?

The Right to Maim situates disability as a register of biopolitical population control, one that modulates which bodies are hailed by institutions to represent the professed progress made by liberal rights–bearing subjects. As with *Terrorist Assemblages*, this book is largely about what happens after certain liberal rights are bestowed, certain thresholds or parameters of success are claimed to have been reached: What happens when "we" get what "we" want? In other words, how is it that we have come to this historical juncture where we can or must talk about "(white) privilege," and "disability" together? But my argument also makes a critical intervention into the literatures of and scholarship on biopolitics, which have been less likely to take up issues of disability and debility. Michel Foucault's foundational formulation hinges on all the population measures that enable some forms of living and inhibit others: birthrates, fertility, longevity, disease, impairment, toxicity, productivity. In other words, these irreducible metrics of biopolitics are also metrics of debility and capacity. Biopolitics deployed through its neoliberal guises is a capacitation machine; biopolitics seeks capacitation for some as a liberal rationale (in some cases) or foil for the debilitation of many others. It is, in sum, an ableist mechanism that debilitates.

Biopolitics as a conceptual paradigm can thus be read as a theory of debility and capacity. Addressing disability directly forces a new, discrete component into the living/dying pendulum that forms most discussions of biopolitics: the living dead, death worlds, necropolitics, slow death, life itself. These frames presume death to be the ultimate assault, transgression, or goal, and the biopolitical end point or opposite of life. I am arguing that debilitation and the production of disability are in fact biopolitical ends unto themselves, with moving neither toward life nor toward death as the aim. This is what I call "the right to maim": a right expressive of sovereign power that is linked to, but not the same as, "the right to kill." Maiming is a source of value extraction from populations that would otherwise be disposable. The right to maim exemplifies the most intensive practice of the

biopolitics of debilitation, where maiming is a sanctioned tactic of settler colonial rule, justified in protectionist terms and soliciting disability rights solutions that, while absolutely crucial to aiding some individuals, unfortunately lead to further perpetuation of debilitation.

In *The Right to Maim*, I focus less on an important project of disability rights and disability studies, which is to refute disability as lack, as inherently undesirable, and as the sign, evidence, or fetish of injustice and victimhood. I am not sidestepping this issue. Rather, I centralize the quest for justice to situate what material conditions of possibility are necessary for such positive reenvisionings of disability to flourish, and what happens when those conditions are not available. My goal here is to examine how disability is *produced*, how certain bodies and populations come into biopolitical being through having greater risk to become disabled than others. The difference between disability and debility that I schematize is not derived from expounding upon and contrasting phenomenological experiences of corporeality, but from evaluating the violences of biopolitical risk and metrics of health, fertility, longevity, education, and geography.

Disability studies scholars such as Nirmala Erevelles and Christopher Bell have insistently pointed out the need in disability studies for intersectional analyses in order to disrupt the normative (white, male, middle-class, physically impaired) subjects that have historically dominated the field.[12] The epistemic whiteness of the field is no dirty secret.[13] Part of how white centrality is maintained is through the policing of disability itself: what it is, who or what is responsible for it, how one lives it, whether it melds into an overarching condition of precarity of a population or is significant as an exceptional attribute of an otherwise fortunate life. These normative subjects cohere not only in terms of racial, class, and gendered privilege; they also tend toward impairments that are thought to be discernible, rather than cognitive and intellectual disabilities, chronic pain conditions like fibromyalgia or migraines, and depression.

The (largely unmarked) Euro-American bias of disability studies has had to confront itself, as the production of most of the world's disability happens through colonial violence, developmentalism, war, occupation, and the disparity of resources—indeed, through U.S. settler colonial and imperial occupations, as a sign of the global reach of empire.[14] In 2006, Livingston noted that "while four-fifths of the world's disabled persons live in developing countries, there is a relative dearth of humanities and social science scholarship exploring disability in non-Western contexts."[15] The same

cannot be said ten years later. Crucial work now exists in southern disability studies; the relation of disability to U.S. incarceration, settler colonialism, and imperialism; and a systemic critique of the military-industrial complex and its debilitating global expanse.[16] The reproduction of this violence through neoliberal biomedical circuits of capital ensures that human rights regimes impose definitions about what disability is, creating evaluations and judgments, and distributes resources unevenly with effects that reorganize and/or reiterate orderings and hierarchies.[17]

Further to this project of unmooring disability from its hegemonic referents, critical ethnic studies, indigenous studies, and postcolonial studies have long been elaborating the debilitating effects of racism, colonialism, exploitative industrial growth, and environmental toxicities. Yet these literatures, because they may not engage the identity rubric of the subject position of the disabled person, are not often read as scholarship on disability.[18] As such, I seek here to connect critical race theory and transnational and postcolonial theory to disability studies scholarship. From the vantage of these interdisciplinary fields, disability is everywhere and yet, for all sorts of important reasons, not claimed as such. Many bodies might not be hailed as disabled but certainly are not awash in the privileges of being able-bodied either. This project is thus less interested in what disability is (or is not), less interested in adding to the registers of disability—for example, including people of color with disabilities—and more driven by the question: what does disability as a concept do? The stigmatization of bodily difference, racialized bodily difference, often understood as bodily defect, is already at the core of how populations come to be in the first place. My project refuses to reify racialization as defect but rather asks what other conceptual alternatives are available besides being relegated to defect or its dichotomous counterpart, embracing pride.

The Right to Maim is absorbed with excavating the chunkiness of power more so than the subtleties of navigating it. That is to say that assemblages can get stuck, blocked, frozen, and instrumentalized. Stories of dividuality are stories of control societies. Rather than assuming a corrective stance, I am interested in contributing to and expanding the critical lexicon, vocabulary, and conceptual apparatuses of biopolitical inquiry on disability, especially for bodies and populations that may fall into neither disability nor ability, but challenge and upturn these distinctions altogether. Throughout the text, multiple relationships of disciplinary, control, and sovereign power are central to my analyses. Detailing the interface of technologies

of discipline and control makes the case for multiplying the relations of the two beyond teleological or geographic deterministic mappings. While the rise of digital forms gives control an anchoring periodization and geospatial rationale, a reliance on this narrative obscures the ongoingness of discipline and the brutal exercise of sovereign power, often cloaked in humanitarian, democratic, or life preservationist terms.

Traversing a number of contemporary political and social issues, my elaboration of debilitation as potentiating capacitation is expounded throughout the book: an examination of the spate of "queer suicides" and the "It Gets Better" response that occurred in the fall of 2010, foregrounding queer (theory) as a capacitation machine; the coalitional potential of trans people and people with disabilities, examining the array of access, delimitation, and foreclosure that trans bodies have in relation to discourses and alliances with disability, the medical-industrial complex, and the recapacitation of whiteness that strategic manipulations of embodiment might afford; Israel's complex program of rehabilitation through the debilitation of Palestinian life and land; the "rehabilitation" of the Israeli state as part of a biopolitical assemblage of control that instrumentalizes a spectrum of capacities and debilities for the use of the occupation of Palestine; the role of targeted debilitation whereby Israel manifests an implicit claim to the right to maim and debilitate Palestinian bodies and environments as a form of biopolitical control and as central to a scientifically authorized humanitarian economy. The framing of the right to maim haunts the book throughout, until it reaches its climactic and most forceful articulation in the final chapter on debilitation as a biopolitical end point unto itself. Observations from time spent in occupied East Jerusalem and the West Bank in January 2016 underscore the effects of the collision between disability rights practices and discourses, largely generated by international nongovernmental organizations, and the reality of the occupation as the primary producer of debility.

WHEN WE BREATHE

In a series in the *New York Times* on "people living with disabilities," feminist disability studies scholar Rosemarie Garland-Thomson wonders why pride movements for people with disabilities "have not gained the same sort of traction in the American consciousness" as the pride movements of "women, gay people, racial minorities, and other groups." Mentioning




FIG. PREF.3. ADAPT activists demonstrating for accessible transportation in Atlanta, Georgia, October 1990. Photo courtesy of Tom Olin.

Black Lives Matter and the LGBTQ rights movement as examples of this traction, she responds to her musings: "One answer is that we have a much clearer collective notion of what it means to be a woman or an African American, gay or transgender person than we do of what it means to be disabled."[19] There is perhaps misrecognition of Black Lives Matter as a "pride" movement, not to mention that at an earlier moment in history, the disability rights movement often marked itself as both intertwined with and following in the path of the black civil rights movement.[20] Analogies between disability and race, gender, and sexuality tend to obfuscate biopolitical realities, as Garland-Thomson's clunky list of identifications attests. Movements need to be intersectional, says Angela Davis, and the rapid uptake of this seasoned observation is invigorating and hopeful.[21] This invocation of intersectional movements should not leave us intact with ally models but rather create new assemblages of accountability, conspiratorial lines of flight, and seams of affinity.

In the midst of the Movement for Black Lives, the fight against the Dakota Access Pipeline, the struggle for socialized health care in the United States, the demand to end U.S. imperial power in the Middle East (Israel,



FIG. PREF.4. The Palestine contingent at the Millions March, New York City, December 2014. The ends of the banner display the pattern of the Palestinian keffiyeh. The Washington Square Arch is visible in the background. Photo courtesy of Direct Action Front for Palestine. Reprinted with artist's permission.

Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen), what constitutes the able body is ever evolving, and its apparent referents are ever shrinking. What is an able body in this context? What is a non-disabled body, and is it the same as an able body? Layers of precarity and vulnerability to police brutality, reckless maiming and killing, deprivation, and destruction of resources that are daily features of living for some populations must not be smoothed over by hailing these bodies as able-bodied if they do not have or claim to be a person(s) with a disability. In the wise words of disability studies scholar and prison abolitionist Liat Ben-Moshe, "It does not matter if people identify as disabled or not."[22] "Hands up, don't shoot!" is not a catchy slogan that emerges from or announces able-bodied populations. Rather, this common Black Lives Matter chant is a revolutionary call for redressing the debilitating logics of racial capitalism. It is a compact sketch of the frozen black body, rendered immobile by systemic racism and the punishment doled out for not transcending it. It is the story of a Palestinian resister shot dead for wielding a knife (if that) against an IDF solider who has the full backing of the world's military might. "I can't breathe!" captures the suffocation of chokeholds on movement in Gaza and the West Bank as it does the violent forces of restraint meted out through police brutality. "Hands up, don't shoot!" and "I can't breathe!" are, in fact, disability justice rally cries.

The Right to Maim therefore does not seek to answer the question, where is our disability pride movement? Instead, it hopes to change the conversation to one that challenges the presumption that the distinction between

who is disabled and who is not should fuel a pride movement. I explore if and how this binary effaces the biopolitical production of precarity and (un)livability that runs across these identities. The project, then, is not just one that hopes to contribute to intersectional movement building, though let me insist that this is crucial from the outset. That is to say, Black Lives Matter and the struggle to end the Israeli occupation of Palestine are not only movements "allied" with disability rights, nor are they only distinct disability justice issues. Rather, I am motivated to think of these fierce organizing practices collectively *as a disability justice movement itself*, as a movement that is demanding an end to so many conditions of precaritization that debilitate many populations. At our current political conjuncture, Black Lives Matter, the Palestinian solidarity movement, the protest against the Dakota Access Pipeline to protect sacred grounds and access to water: these are some of the movements that are leading the way to demand livable lives for all. These movements may not represent the most appealing or desired versions of disability pride. But they are movements anchored, in fact, in the lived experiences of debilitation, implicitly contesting the right to maim, and imagining multiple futures where bodily capacities and debilities are embraced rather than weaponized.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This is a book first and foremost about biopolitics. It is a continuation of thinking about many of the issues raised in *Terrorist Assemblages*, a text that was fortunate enough to garner several unexpected readerships. Noted disability studies scholars Robert McRuer and David Mitchell offered expansive re-readings of the "upright" homonationalist citizen, elegantly wedding conceptions of "ablenationalism" and "crip nationalism" to homonationalism and expanding its frame considerably. The other major readership that invited me into new directions was that of scholars of Middle Eastern studies. I welcomed the solicitation of *Terrorist Assemblages* into these conversations and worked diligently to foster the kinds of inter- and transdisciplinary connections that I believe are the payoff of the risks that such frames allow. As such, this scholarship is active, insofar as I have attempted to grapple with reception, responses, and events as they have emerged. For quite some time I thought I was writing two distinct books, one on racism as chronic debilitation that posed a challenge to non-disabled/disabled binaries, the other on settler colonial occupation and sexuality in Palestine. Where and how these two projects became one is evident, I believe, in the manner in which this book unfolds and in the productive tensions between abstraction and location, intellectual analysis and political commitment (should those even be fantasized as separable). The effort herein to bring together conceptual impulses typically rendered distinct, dichotomous even, signals the main political import of this work. Moreover it seemed necessary to write a book marking the limits of Euro-American framings of disability while also providing concepts to spatialize the relationality of absence to presence and actually attending in some small way to alleviating the absence itself. Through this process, it is now hard to imagine ever conceiving of this book as two stand-alone projects. This

and I admire deeply their commitment to the communities they draw together through the crucial work they do.

This book is dedicated to the fortitude of the Palestinian people, the imminent liberation of Palestine, and whatever new worlds and struggles that may bring.

INTRODUCTION: THE COST OF GETTING BETTER

Many things are lost in the naming of a death as a "gay youth suicide."[1] In what follows, I offer a preliminary analysis of the prolific media attention to gay youth suicides that began in the fall of 2010.[2] I am interested in how the hailing of this event recalls affective attachments to neoliberalism that index a privileged geopolitics of finance capitalism. These tragic deaths were memorialized in numerous public statements, vigils, and public displays of mourning. I have been struck by how the discourses surrounding gay youth suicide partake in a spurious binarization of an interdependent relationship between bodily capacity and bodily debility. These discourses reproduce neoliberalism's heightened demands for bodily capacity, even as this same neoliberalism marks out populations for what Lauren Berlant has described as "slow death"—the debilitating ongoingness of structural inequality and suffering.[3] In the United States, where personal debt incurred through medical expenses is the number one reason for filing for bankruptcy, the centrality of what is termed the medical-industrial complex to the profitability of slow death cannot be overstated.[4] My intervention here is an attempt to go beyond the critique of the queer neoliberalism and homonormativity—indeed, homonationalism—embedded in the tendentious mythologizing that "It Gets Better" by confronting not only the debilitating aspects of neoliberalism but, more trenchantly, the economics of debility. If the knitting of finance capitalism and the medical-industrial complex means that debility pays, and pays well, how can a politics of disability move beyond the conventional narratives of resistance to neoliberalism? What are the vectors for a politics of disability if debility marks the convergence of capitalism and slow death via its enfolding into neoliberalism?

Disability and debility can be thought of as two concepts describing similar phenomena under late capitalism with strikingly different effects and

entangled political limitations and possibilities. I argue, first, for a critical deployment of the concepts of debility and capacity to rethink disability through, against, and across the disabled/non-disabled binary. I situate disability in relation to concepts such as neoliberal and affective capacitation, debilitation, and slow death; "slow death" is in some sense a mode of neoliberal and affective capacitation or debilitation as mediated by different technological assemblages. Second, I want to explore the potential of affective tendencies to inform these assemblages of debility, capacity, and disability, noting that capacity is a key word of affective theorizing that can be generative when situated within the political economies of control societies. Affect amalgamates nonhuman entities, objects, and technologies. Technological platforms—new media, prosthetic technologies, biomedical enhancements—mediate bodily comportments, affects, and what is recognized as bodily capacity and bodily debility. Technology acts both as a machine of debility and capacity and as portals of affective openings and closures. I engage technology and slow death as they modulate debility and capacity without relying on conventional and straightforward political cants of a rational public sphere, autonomous political actors, and the binary of resistance/passivity.

LIFELOGGING AND ECOLOGIES OF SENSATION

What kinds of cultural assumptions are reflected within and produced through the "event" of queer suicide? Tyler Clementi was a Rutgers University undergraduate who joined a growing list of young gay men who took their own lives in the fall of 2010. Two students, Dharun Ravi and Molly Wei, were involved in several instances of sex surveillance of Clementi's dating during the time leading up to the suicide. All three were living on Busch campus in Piscataway, already codified as the science or premed "geek" campus (some might say "sissies"). At Rutgers, where I teach, Busch is also informally racially demarcated as the "Asian" campus, an identity often converging with that of "geek" at U.S. colleges. Clementi's suicide predictably occasioned a vicious anti-Asian backlash replete with overdetermined notions of "Asian homophobia" and calls to "go back to where you came from" (Ravi and Wei are from New Jersey).[5] Commenting on the biases of the criminal justice system against those of non-normative race, ethnicity, and citizenship, a press release from a Rutgers organization called Queering the Air remarked that Garden State Equality (a New Jersey LGBT

advocacy group) and Campus Pride (a national group for LGBTQ students) demanded the most severe consequences for Ravi and Wei, prosecution for hate crimes, maximum jail time, and expulsion without disciplinary hearing, noting that "18,000 people endorse an online group seeking even more serious charges—manslaughter."[6] Discussions quickly turned to antibullying legislation and other forms of state intervention, as well as the need for more LGBTQ centers and organizations in schools and on campuses.[7] Blame was accorded to the perpetrators of the bullying, the schools where these environments are sustained, the apparent lack of legal redress, conservative opposition to antibullying legislation, gay marriage bans, Don't Ask Don't Tell (DADT), and society at large.

The implications of two "model minority" students from New Jersey suburbs targeting an effete young queer white man might be considered beyond convenient cultural narratives of the so-called inherent homophobia within racialized immigrant communities. The war on terror did much to suture a homonational rendering of the sexual other as white and the racial other as straight, and this binary unsurprisingly informed much discourse implicitly, if not explicitly. In the trial that ensued and its aftermath, several things came into relief. First of all, the consolidation of Ravi's "homophobia"—whether a reasonable assessment or not of Ravi's affective comportment—produced a powerful mechanism to deflect from manifold vectors of homophobia, in particular the upset of Clementi's mother to his recent "coming out."[8] Ravi's own complex masculinity seems to involve model minority immigrant conditioning that both made him vulnerable to taunts to "go back to where he came from" (even though he migrated from India to the United States at age five) and the threat of deportation and also parsed him out from a "person of color" identification or positioning, distinct from blacks or Latinos, who are more likely to face incarceration.[9] Thus, while the contestation of the mistreatment of Ravi largely revolved around the racial biases of the U.S. criminal justice system, Ravi was scapegoated in part not only because he was vulnerable to racism but because he was perceived as having had eclipsed and excelled past such structures of race. In other words, Ravi was punished not because he is the target population of biopolitical incarceration but rather for supposedly daring to escape this target population. The disciplinary apparatus at work here, then, which is not only about reinforcing the criminality of certain always-already criminals but also about creating docile subjects among those who just barely manage to escape the projection of criminality, has thus little to do with

whether Ravi is sentenced to jail time. The use of the charge of "homophobia" to discipline and domesticate racialized minorities is by now a well-worn tactic in the biopolitical management of populations folded into life but "not quite/not white" or "almost the same but not quite."[10] No doubt this charge has had effects on the comportment of students of color across the Rutgers campuses if not far beyond.[11]

Is it possible to see all three students involved as more alike—all geeks, in fact—than different? Instead of rehashing that old "gaybashers are secretly closet cases" canard, perhaps there is a reason to destabilize the alignments of "alikeness" and "difference" away from a singular, predictable axis pivoting on a discrete and knowable "sexuality." A letter circulated by Queering the Air claims that Clementi's death was the second suicide by an LGBTQ student since March and that four of the last seven suicides at Rutgers were related to sexuality.[12] What, then, is meant here by "related to sexuality"? I am prompted by Amit Rai's reformulation of sexuality as "ecologies of sensation"—as affect instead of identity—that transcends the designations of straight and gay and can further help to disaggregate these binary positions from their racialized histories.[13]

Accusations of "homophobia," "gay bullying," and even "cyberbullying" do not do justice to the complex uptake of digital "lifelogging" technologies in this story. Lifelogging refers to forms of emergent technologies, loosely grouped together, that seek to ensure that every event in (your) life is logged. These include surveillance technologies—technologies of pleasure, fun, amusement, and capacity enhancement that wind up surveilling as their by-product—as well as technologies that deliberately surveil for capacity production as their primary task. All are part of a milieu of apparatuses that appear, through various methods, to document, record, translate, and qualify the everydayness of living.[14] Missing from the debate about Clementi's suicide is a discussion about the proclivities of young people to see the "choice" of Internet surveillance as a regulatory part of their subject formations while also capacitating bodily habits and affective tendencies. Note that the designation of the "digital native" carries largely negative associations, with this term linked to the perceived loss of normative "face-to-face" sociality. For these youth (but not only for youth) "cyberstalking" is an integral part of what it means to become a neoliberal (sexual) subject. Think of the ubiquity of sexting, applications like Grindr, Tinder, Manhunt, DIY porn, and mass cell phone circulation of images, technologies that

create simultaneous sensations of exposure (the whole world is watching) and alienation (no one understands).

These cyborgian practices proliferate new relations between public and private, with speed, so much so that we are often dealing with the effect of such repatterning before we comprehend the force of it. "Invasion of privacy" remains uncharted territory for jurisprudence in relation to the Internet. More significantly, these technologies impel the affective tendencies of bodies, altering forms of attention, distraction, practice, and repetition.[15] The presumed differences between "gay" and "straight" could otherwise be thought more generously through the quotidian and banal activities of sexual self-elaboration via social media—emergent habituations, corporeal comportment, and an array of diverse switchpoints of bodily capacity.[16] In this broadcast environment, Clementi's participation in the testimonial spaces of the chat room to detail his roommate's invasion into his "privacy" and his use of Facebook for the explanatory "suicide note" reflect precisely the shared continuities with his perpetrators through ecologies of sensation.

The multimodality of connective media involved in the "event" (text, Facebook, Internet, IM, Skype, video camera, Twitter) also impacts and potentially changes what "narrative" is and how it is constructed and excavated. Implicit in lifelogging is the rescaled and temporized notion of what constitutes an "event," which now coheres through the act of logging/recording and the placement of a time stamp.[17] One such instance of rescaling occurred in Ravi's trial, where it became unclear whether erasing one's texts automatically insinuated an erasing of evidence. Events are thus data-driven, informational as well as experiential, the digitalizing of information rotating in the loop between memory and archive. Facebook, Twitter, and numerous other documentation technologies that seduce the securitization of memory can no longer be constituted as simply extracurricular activities.[18] Rather, they have been incorporated and normativized into quotidian rhythms of communication, information dissemination and retention, and the affective tendencies and habituations of bodies.[19]

Exhortations of protest regarding the encroachment of privacy abound, even as the offering up of one's privacy becomes the very currency of proven competency and proficiency of the usage of these technologies, not to mention of modern-day storytelling of the self. This contradiction of the neoliberal subject—of wanting one's privacy while being increasing impelled


into circuits that might seemingly reward for revealing what that privacy shields—is not only bred of the sense of orchestrating how, when, and where such intimate privates are crafted and rejected. Rather, the neo/liberal "right to privacy" seems to coexist—because of rather than despite these contradictions—with desires for intimacies, intimacies that cannot be determined or defined alone by relations of proximity or experiences of intrusion. The seemingly contradictory unfolding of Clementi's suicide, involving both the violation of privacy through the video-camming of sexual activity and his announcement of his suicidal intentions in a chat room and on Facebook, are actually co-constitutive elements of this modern paradox of privacy and intrusion. Action-at-a-distance technologies create forms of touching—whether through "subtle coercion or explicit duress."[20] These touchings mediate intimacy as a relation of proximity, reorganizing the scale and temporal mandates of intimate connection. Clementi's suicide, then, could be thought of as an "action-at-a-distance" mediated event, one that unfolded by increasing zones of contact between bodies rather than participating in traditional notions of proximity/distance, public/private divides, and experiences of violation, intrusion, and exposure.

DOES IT GET BETTER?

> Because the idea of the enviable life has now replaced the idea of the good life, it may be difficult to hear, or listen to, the parts of our patients or students that are not interested in success. There are, as we know, people around for whom being successful has not been a success. . . . Our ambitions—our ideals and success stories that lure us into the future—can too easily become ways of not living in the present, or of not being present at the event, a blackmail of distraction; ways, that is, of disowning, or demeaning, the actual disorder of experience. Believing in the future can be a great deadener. Perhaps we have been too successful at success and failure, and should now start doing something else. —ADAM PHILLIPS, *On Flirtation*

Narrations of the relationship between Clementi and Ravi utterly foreclosed queer-on-queer cyberstalking as a possibility. Not once were the sexual orientations of the Asian American students even speculated upon; mainstream discourses automatically defaulted to the assumption that they were both heterosexual. This pernicious binary, the sexual other is white, the racial other is straight, is also in full display in a video produced by gay journalist Dan Savage in response to Tyler Clementi's and other suicides of young, mostly white gay men, titled "It Gets Better." As noted by cultural critic Tavia Nyong'o, Savage's sanctimonious "It Gets Better" video is a mandate to fold into urban, neoliberal gay enclaves, a form of liberal handholding and upward mobility that discordantly echoes the now discredited "pull yourself up by the bootstraps" immigrant motto.[21] Savage embodies the spirit of a secular neoliberal coming-of-age success story. He is monied, confident, well traveled, and suitably partnered; he betrays no trace of abjection or shame. His message translates to: come out, move to the city, travel to Paris, adopt a kid, pay your taxes, demand representation, save yourself; that's how it's done. In this video, Savage is basically a representative of "your" future, of how "you" should model it, universalizing a neoliberal politics of exceptional responsibilization. The focus on the future normalizes the present tense of teen bullying and evacuates the politics of the now from culpability, letting contemporary conditions, along with any politics attempting to redress it, off the hook. In terms of genre, it parallels what disability studies scholar Stella Young called "inspiration porn."[22] While Savage explains that he left behind his small town and his Catholic school–educated past, his story nonetheless evokes the religious genre of spiritual salvation, Savage having survived and thus earned his homosexual stripes.[23] There is uncanny resonance with the religious exhortation "I was saved"—albeit not by a divine force, but by himself. Who or what is the agent in the exhortation "It Gets Better"? The genre of religious conversion is relevant here; Savage is proselytizing. In concert with this proselytizing ethos, "It Gets Better" has become a veritable campaign, inaugurating spin-offs in multiple genres, languages, and programming platforms.[24] It has also become the mantra for Google's own advertising of its media platforms (Chrome and YouTube in particular) and the power of social media as a force harnessed for social change.[25]

How useful is it to imagine troubled gay youth might master their injury and turn blame and guilt into transgression, triumph, and all-American success? Savage's "retro-homo-reprofuturism," a term coined by Dana Luciano to describe "the projection of one's own past self onto the youth of today in order to revise one's own ordinary life into exceptional progress narrative," functions to misread the impasse of the present as an inability to imagine the future.[26] In his closing imperative statement—"You have to live"—Savage capitalizes on a neoliberal sentiment that detaches individual well-being from any collective, social responsibility. During the U.S.



FIGS. INTRO.1 AND INTRO.2. Screenshots from Google Chrome's "It Gets Better" video, featuring Dan Savage.

AIDS crisis, the charge of ACT UP activists was "You are killing us!," the "you" being the state, understood as responsible for addressing the crisis and providing care to its citizens (and noncitizens). The "you" is also the social and the political, the broader social and political contexts within which homosexual bodies could be sacrificed to such indifference and neglect. By contrast, Savage does not direct his message to the endemic social and political forces that continue to manifest homophobic hatred. Instead, his "you" is the individual, to whom and only to whom he credits the survival of gay bullying. In this regard, "It Gets Better" presumes the end, the aftermath of the AIDS crisis, rather than any homage to its ongoing deleterious effects or current situation. The move from AIDS as death to homosexual life also mirrors moves from sex and public sexuality to kinship and its privatized familial forms and from the state as the site of redress to the market as the site of the actualization and realization of the queer self. Queer failure is braided into this story of success.

Although it has been lauded by gay liberals for having "done something" to address the recent spate of queer youth suicides, critics note that queers of color, trans, genderqueer, and gender-nonconforming youth, and lesbians have not been inspirationally hailed by IGB.[27] Diana Cage of Velvetpark: Dyke Culture in Bloom contends: "We all know it gets better a lot sooner if you are white, cisgendered, and middle class."[28] Several writers ask what is forgotten in the push to imagine "gay youth" as exceptionally susceptible to bullying and more likely to commit suicide than their straight peers.[29] Laurel Dykstra worries about seeming unsympathetic by questioning this oft-cited empirical "fact," pointing out that Aboriginal youth in Canada and the United States might in fact have a higher suicide rate than queer youth.[30] Finally, racial and sexual harassment, rape, and other forms of sexual policing of girls remain unaddressed through the use of a reified notion of "homophobia." In "It Doesn't Get Better," Alec Webley writes, "The problem is not homophobia. The problem is bullying." Webley argues that teenage bullying is a widespread phenomenon that affects youth of many persuasions who are "different" and "don't fit in"; he also highlights the wide prevalence of workplace bullying.[31]

The momentum from "It Gets Better" has generated a fairly predictable array of U.S. liberal gay movement anger toward conservative opposition to antibullying legislation, even as the apparently "sudden" spate of queer suicides appears irreconcilable with the purported progress of the

gay and lesbian rights movement.[32] The symbolism of Clementi's transit from central New Jersey to the George Washington Bridge that connects northern New Jersey to upper Manhattan is painfully apparent. Part of the outrage generated by these deaths is based precisely in a belief that things are indeed (supposed to be) better, especially for a particular class of white gay men, and especially as compared with other parts of the "less civilized" world. From this vantage, IGB reflects a desire for the reinstatement of (white) racial privilege that was lost by being gay, one that is achievable through equality rights agendas like gay marriage and participation in neoliberal consumer culture. In other words, IGB is based on an expectation that it was supposed to be better. And thus IGB might turn out to mean, you get more normal. Such affirmations—and, indeed, mandates—of life may well work to actually inhibit other kinds of lives. Thus, "It Gets Better" circulates as a projection of bodily capacity that ultimately partakes in slow death, even as it reforms the valence of debility—homosexual identity—through a white/liberal/male assemblage: a recapacitation machine.

Despite this critique, the "It Gets Better" project should hardly be dismissed out of hand; its virality is in itself interesting.[33] It is no doubt crucial that IGB opened space for the expression of public anguish and collective mourning. But ultimately, the best part of the viral explosion of Savage's project is that so many have chimed in to explain how and why it doesn't just get better. The very technological media platform of the phenomenon allows for immanent critique. The universalizing force of IGB is undercut by the rapid accumulation of community promoted by the Google Chrome advertisement using the "It Gets Better" campaign. The commercial marshals IGB to exhibit the utility of Google Chrome, specifically, and to demonstrate the community-building capacity of the Internet more generally. In this brilliant example of the monetization of affect, the advertisement assembles varied expressions of IGB—varied in terms of bodies, comportments, languages. Unlike the proselytizing tone of IGB, the advertisement draws on a different affect, that of religious ecstasy and rapture. Life is already better, life is fantastic, and the numbers are flying around. Further, Google Chrome manages to transact a savvy linkage to political activism without doing anything but more of what it does, devoid of political substance. As such, the "It Gets Better" campaign now shimmers on the Internet as an ironic testament to how it actually may not get better.

Savage has also mastered, if we follow S. Lochlann Jain on the "politics of sympathy," the technique of converting his injury into cultural capital not only through rhetorics of blame, guilt, and suffering but also through those of triumph, transgression, and success.[34] The subject of redress and grievance thus functions here as a recapacitation of a debilitated body. The preceding sections recast the white queer/immigrant homophobe binary by distilling the event of queer suicide through ecologies of sensation, technics, and affect. Here I want to further shift the registers of this conversation from one about the pathologization versus normativization of sexual identity, to questions of bodily debility, capacity, disability. This is not at all to dismiss these queer suicides as privileged forms of death. I want to emphasize this: I am not making a critique about relative intersectional privilege.

Rather, I am probing what kinds of slow deaths have been ongoing that a suicide might represent an escape from. In order to "slow down" the act of suicide—to offer a concomitant yet different temporality of relating to living and dying—one must slow down the speed of encounter, as speed itself might be understood as debilitating. These temporalities of speed and slowness are thus convivial, not antagonistic. Berlant's piece on slow death discusses the most prevalent health problem in the United States, that of obesity.[35] I cannot do her formulation of temporality and living adequate justice here, but I would like to highlight the following aspects of her argument that I find compatible to—indeed generative for—my own thinking. Berlant moves us away from the event of trauma or catastrophe, proposing that "slow death occupies the temporalities of the endemic."[36] This echoes the transformation of the epidemic into the endemic whereby, for Michel Foucault, writing in *Security, Territory, Population*, "death becomes durational."[37] Displacing military encounters, genocides, and other discrete time frames of traumatic events (though later in this book I contest the formulation of these happenings as discrete), slow death occurs not within the time scale of the crisis, not of the event of the suicide or the epidemic, but in "a zone of temporality . . . of ongoingness, getting by, and living on, where the structural inequalities are dispersed, the pacing of their experience intermittent, often in phenomena not prone to capture by a consciousness organized by archives of memorable impact."[38] In this nonlinear temporality, for it starts and stops, redoubles and leaps ahead, Berlant is not "defining a group of individuals merely afflicted with the

same ailment, [rather] slow death describes populations marked out for wearing out."[39] That is to say, slow death is not about an orientation toward the death drive, nor is it morbid; rather, it is about the maintenance of living, the "ordinary work of living on."[40] Slow death is, quite simply, "a condition of being worn out by the activity of reproducing life."[41] As Berlant notes, this puts living and dying into a specific zone of proximity and precarity: "While death is usually deemed an event in contrast to life's 'extensivity,' in this domain dying and the ordinary reproduction of life are coextensive."[42]

Queer suicide, in the context of slow death mediated by technocultural ecologies of sensation, reorganizes what is thought of as the event, distills the experience of trauma, and requires a turn to debility, capacity, and disability, concepts that give us alternative temporal frames for imagining the body in processes of de- and regeneration. David Mitchell's moving invocation of disability "not as exception, but the basis upon which a decent and just social order is founded," hinges upon a society that acknowledges, accepts, and even anticipates disability.[43] This anticipatory disability has been the dominant temporal frame of disability rights activism—"you're only able-bodied until you're disabled," or "temporarily able-bodied." This statement is mobilized to defuse ableist fantasies of endless capacity, to challenge the presentation of life as an unlimited resource, and to collectivize a rights-based politics of disability. Disability is posited as the most common identity category because "we" will all belong to it "someday, if we live long enough." Despite this purportedly inevitable communal fate, David Mitchell and Sharon Snyder argue that disability is "reified as the true site of insufficiency."[44] But Berlant's formulation of slow death implies that we might not (only) be haunted by the disability to come, but also disavowing the debility that is already here. More trenchantly, some are living the disability that does not get codified or recognized as such, not only as a true site of insufficiency but as a mark or remainder or reminder of that which is already constituted as insufficient. There are two different progressive forms of temporality that are upended here. One, slow death neutralizes the descriptor "better" in "It Gets Better," proposing that the pathways to getting better are limned with precarity. Two, "We will all be disabled one day, if we live long enough"—the disability to come—is already built on an entitled hope and expectation for a certain longevity.

Berlant argues that "health itself can then be seen as a side effect of successful normativity."[45] Therefore, in order to honor the complexity of these suicides, they must be placed within the broader context of neoliberal demands for bodily capacity (what are often constituted as neoliberal "opportunities" or "choices" for the body) as well as the profitability of debility, both functioning as central routes through which finance capital seeks to sustain itself. Capacity and debility are, on the one hand, seeming opposites generated by increasingly demanding neoliberal formulations of health, agency, and choice—what I call a liberal eugenics of lifestyle programming—that produce, along with biotechnologies and bioinformatics, population aggregates. Those "folded" into life are seen as more capacious or on the side of capacity, while those targeted for premature or slow death are figured as on the side of debility. Such an analysis reposes the question: Which bodies are made to pay for "progress"? Which debilitated bodies can be reinvigorated for neoliberalism, available and valuable enough for rehabilitation, and which cannot be?

In this regard, Savage's project refigures queers, along with other bodies heretofore construed as excessive and/or erroneous, as capacity-laden, demanding that queerness operates as a machine of capacity.[46] Even though poststructuralist queer theory critically deploys registers of negativity (and increasingly negative affect) in reading practices primarily deconstructive in their orientation, such a figuration of queer theory has emerged from a homeostatic framework: queer theory is already also a machine of capacity in and after the cybernetic turn. (This is important because what is being hailed as the antisocial turn in queer theory and its opposite, a focus on hope, optimism, and utopia, are rebounding within a dialectic that misses the implication of the capacity machine that is queer theory).[47] Furthermore, bioinformatic frames—in which bodies figure not as identities or subjects but as data—entail that there is no such thing as nonproductive excess but only emergent forms of new information.[48] This revaluing of excess is potent because, simply put, debility is profitable for capitalism. In neoliberal, biomedical, and biotechnological terms, the body is always debilitated in relation to its ever-expanding potentiality. This is precisely what Foucault presciently outlined in his 1978–79 lectures, now translated into English as *The Birth of Biopolitics*. Foucault writes that the "theory of human capital"[49]—a breakdown of labor into capital and income that builds on the Marxian conception of labor power—is one of "capital ability" where

"the worker himself appears as a sort of enterprise for himself."[50] This formulation of human capital Foucault calls an "abilities machine": "being for himself, his own capital, being for himself his own producer, being for himself, the source of (his) earnings."[51] He continues: "The wage is nothing other than the remuneration, the income allowed to a certain capital, a capital we will call human capital inasmuch as the ability-machine of which it is the income cannot be separated from the human individual who is its bearer."[52] What composes the assemblage of the abilities machine? With a brief nod to hereditary differences, Foucault turns to educational investments, quality of parenting, affective attention, mobility, migration, health care, public hygiene, and any number of related elements that create a "whole environmental analysis."[53] Here in Foucault are the eerie echoes of Dan Savage's exhortations to live in "It Gets Better." The body as an ability-machine takes its place among other forms of for-profit capital.

One might wonder, given Foucault's formulation, what body is not an ability-machine? Or, more succinctly, what body is not striving toward becoming an ability-machine? Margrit Shildrick writes, "The binary of disabled and non-disabled undoubtedly lingers . . . but it is increasingly destabilized by the intimation that all forms of embodiment are subject to reconstruction, extension, and transformation, regardless of the conventionally identified vectors of change and decay."[54] Even as the demands of able-body-ism weigh heavily and have been challenged by disability scholars and activists, attachments to the difference of disabled bodies may reify an (human) exceptionalism that only certain privileged disabled bodies can occupy.[55] Efforts to "diversify" and multiply the subjects of study of disability have led to an impasse as the notion of the subject itself is already revealed to be a disciplinary construct of ableism, especially in the realm of cognition, agency, and "voice"—all challenges to any political platform that is fueled predominantly through representational mandates. Nicole Markotic and Robert McRuer caution against what they term "disability culturalism"—a dominant focus on representational politics—along with variants of "barbarism" and "crip nationalism" that reinscribe the centrality of prevailing discourses on race, national identity, gender, and region, producing privileged disabled bodies in distinction to various "others." In sum, the particular binary categorization of dis/abled subjectivity is one that has many parallels to as well as intersects with other kinds of binary categorizations propagated—in fact, demanded—by neoliberal constructions of failed

and capacitated bodies. Therefore, we cannot see this binary production as specific only to the distinction of disabled versus non-disabled subjects—all bodies are being evaluated in relation to their success or failure in terms of health, wealth, progressive productivity, upward mobility, enhanced capacity. And, there is no such thing as an "adequately abled" body anymore.

How does the study of capacity and debility complicate the terms of disability rights paradigms? While the disability rights movement in large part understands disability as a form of nonnormativity that deserves to be depathologized, disability justice activists seek to move beyond access issues foregrounded by the Americans with Disabilities Act as well as global human rights frames that standardize definitions of disability and the terms of their legal redress across national locations. Rights discourses produce human beings in order to give them rights; they discriminate which bodies are vested with futurity, or more accurately, they cultivate (some/certain) bodies that can be vested with futurity. Critiquing the disability rights movement, disability justice activist Mia Mingus, who identifies as a "queer, physically disabled Korean woman transracial and transnational adoptee," writes: "Most access right now is about inclusion and equality: how do we bring disabled people to our table? How do we make sure disabled people have access to what we have? How do we get disabled people access to the current system? Rather than thinking that the entire 'table' or 'system' might need to change or working to embrace difference. Justice does not have to equal sameness or assimilation; and justice and equality are not the same thing."[56]

Mingus highlights populations (institutionalized, incarcerated, racialized) for whom claiming the term and identity of disability is difficult given many are already stigmatized as nonnormative, and deemed in need of fixing, by the medical-industrial complex. Claiming that the "disabled people who identify as '(politically) disabled' are often white disabled people," Mingus continues: "Over and over I meet disabled women of color who do not identify as disabled, even though they have the lived reality of being disabled. And this is for many complicated reasons around race, ability, gender, access. . . . It can be very dangerous to identify as disabled when your survival depends on you denying it."[57]

Her analysis suggests that access to the identity of disability in this regard is a function, result, and reclamation of white privilege. The further fact of the duress under which racially marked communities labor means,

as Mingus writes, "the bodies of our communities are under siege by forces that leverage violence and ableism at every turn."[58] In working poor and working-class communities of color, disabilities and debilities are not nonnormative, even if the capacitizing use of the category disabled may be tenuous and the reign of ableism is a constitutive facet. The goal of these activist efforts does not remain at the restitution of the disabled subject—soliciting tolerance, acceptance, and empowerment—but rather directs attention to the debilitating conditions of the medical-industrial complex itself. To this end, Mingus avows: "As organizers, we need to think of access with an understanding of disability justice, moving away from an equality-based model of sameness and 'we are just like you' to a model of disability that embraces difference, confronts privilege and challenges what is considered 'normal' on every front. We don't want to simply join the ranks of the privileged; we want to dismantle those ranks and the systems that maintain them."[59]

Thus a political agenda that disavows pathology is intertwined with a critique of the embedded structures of liberal eugenics propagated by the medical-industrial complex and its attendant forms of administrative surveillance—those structures that issue forth the distinctions between (racial) pathologization and normality in the first instance.[60] Such work suggests that an increasingly demanding ableism (and, I would add, an increasingly demanding disableism inherent in normative forms of disability as exceptionalism) is producing nonnormativity not only through the sexual and racial pathologization of certain "unproductive bodies" but more expansively through the (in)ability to register within neoliberal capacity.

What is implicit (if not often explicit) in disability justice critiques is the constitutive slow death of debility in terms of precarity and populations. The term "debility" can attach to the global south but can also be deployed in disenfranchised communities within global north locales to suggest debility as endemic, perhaps even normative, to disenfranchised communities: not nonnormative, not exceptional, not that which is to come or can be avoided, but a banal feature of quotidian existence that is already definitive of the precarity of that existence. The conditions that make disability endemic as opposed to exceptional are already ones of entrenched economic, racial, political, and social disenfranchisement. Attending to this banality might involve "engag[ing] in the actuarial




FIG. INTRO.3. The medical-industrial complex diagram. Created by disability justice activist Mia Mingus.

imaginary of biopolitics," says Berlant, "to turn ordinary life into crisis ordinariness."[61]

If debility is endemic to disenfranchised communities, it is doubly so because the forms of financialization that accompany neoliberal economics and the privatization of services also produce debt as debility. This relationship between debt and debility can be described as a kind of "financial expropriation": "The profit made by financial institutions out of the personal income of workers is a form of financial expropriation, seen as additional profit generated in the realm of circulation."[62] Further, as Berlant expounds, medicalization as privatization is a "rerouting of the relations of governmental, corporate, and personal responsibility rather than, as it often seems to be, the ejection of the state from oversight of the public good in deference to corporations."[63] Debt peonage, in the context

of Foucault's theory of human capital, is an updated version of Marx's critique of "choice" under capitalism. Debt as enclosure, as immobility, is what Gilles Deleuze writes of in his description of control societies: "Man is no longer man enclosed, but man in debt."[64] This is especially true, as mentioned earlier, in the United States, where health care expenses are the number one cause of personal bankruptcy, a capacitation of slow death through debt undertaken to support one's health. This theory of human capital entails that when one falls short of proper investment in the enterprise of oneself, one is, as Geeta Patel points out, paying for one's own slow death, through insurial and debt structures predicated on risk and insecurity, and essentially forced into agreeing to one's own debilitation.[65]

FROM EPISTEMOLOGICAL CORRECTIVE TO ONTOLOGICAL IRREDUCIBILITY

The Right to Maim inhabits the intersections of disability studies, critical race studies, and the affective turn, all fields of inquiry that put duress on the privileging of the subject as a primary site of bodily interpellation. The affective turn, alongside the critical deployment of affect as a rubric of analysis and inquiry, more potently signals the contestation over the dominant terms of critical theory itself and the limits of poststructuralist interpretive practices that focus solely on language, signification, and representation. The sites of struggle and their targets include social constructionism (reinvigorated interrogation of biological matter that challenges both biological determinism and also performativity); epistemology (supplemented with ontology and ontogenesis); psychoanalysis (trauma rethought as the intensification of the body's relation to itself); humanism (the capacities of nonhuman animals as well as the durational capacities of inorganic matter are highlighted by scholarship on object-oriented ontology, critical animal studies, and posthumanism); and agency (linked to cognition, perception, emotion, and feeling: an anthropocentric framing of movement challenged by affect, force, intensity, and theories of sensation).[66] These undulating trajectories are arguably more significant than what affect is or what it means. They open a reinvigorated interrogation of biological matter that still challenges biological determinism and the "ontological realism" of matter through displacing the role of language, signification, representation, and the linguistic essentialism of the human.[67] What exactly language is and the place of language itself are being resignified and multiplied.[68] Part of this reenvisioning is forecasted by Mel Chen's understanding that language is not opposed to matter; rather, language is matter.[69]

Thus the affective turn goes far beyond the consolidation and dispersal of affect as an analytic. The modulation and surveillance of affect operates as a form of sociality that regulates good and bad subjects, possible and impossible bodily capacities. Affect is at once an exchange or interchange between bodies and also an object of control. Why the destabilization of the subject and a turn to affect matters is because affect—as a bodily matter—makes identity both possible and yet impossible. And if affect makes identity cohere and dissolve—identity as the habituation of affect—it more forcefully marks the limits of identity itself. Affect impels not only dissolution of the subject but, more significantly, a dissolution of the organic body (the contours of which should never be assumed to be stable, disability studies reminds us) as forces of energy are transmitted, shared, and circulated. The body, as Brian Massumi argues, "passes from one state of capacitation to a diminished or augmented state of capacitation," always bound up in the lived past of the body but always in passage to a changed future.[70] Affect is precisely the body's hopeful opening, a speculative opening not wedded to the dialectic of hope and hopelessness but rather a porous affirmation of what could or might be. It is thus not an opening toward or against or in relation to a teleological notion of time, prognosis time, or forces that simply resist or disrupt progressive time. Affect moves us away from terms such as "past," "present," and "future" to reorient us around what Manuel DeLanda calls "non-metric time": speed, pace, duration, timing, rhythms, frequency. Time becomes less an epistemological unit of organization and instead thought of as ontologically irreducible, constitutive to becoming, a speculative opening—indeed, time in affective terms is becoming itself.

One supposition of affective analysis is that there is no pure debility or pure capacity. Debility and capacity are not properties or attributes of one discrete body or a representational grid certain bodies are placed into. Debility may well simultaneously appropriate bodily capacities closing off, perhaps to give rise to a new set of bodily capacities. Capacity is not discretely of the body. It is shaped by and bound to interface with prevailing notions of chance, risk, accident, luck, and probability, as well as with bodily limits/incapacity, disability, and debility. This deployment of the term "capacity" is an amendment to affect studies, which posits affect as

the endless capacitation of the individuated body, even as it might always see that body as relational. In reading affect through and with populations along with bodies, dividuals beside individuals, and societies of control working through forms of discipline, I want to provide a necessary corrective to studies of affect that take the integrity of the human form for granted.

The political mandate behind such conceptualizations of disability—not what disability is but what it does and how it is used to simultaneously capacitate and debilitate—is to put the disabled/non-disabled binary in dialogue with assemblages of disability, capacity, and debility. Inviting a deconstruction of what able-bodiedness and capacity mean (they are not equivalent to each other), affectively and otherwise, entails schematizing the biopolitics of debility, one that destabilizes the seamless production of able bodies in relation to disability and also suggests the capacitation of disabled bodies through circuits of (white) racial and economic privilege, citizenship status, and legal, medical, and social accommodations. Access is theorized not only in terms of infrastructure, work, social services, and public space but also in terms of access to health itself. While providing a much-needed intersectional critique that destabilizes the white, Euro-American, economically privileged subjects that are most likely to be interpellated as "a person with disabilities," I am also building off of solidly argued critiques of identity to highlight constantly shifting assemblages of power.

Recent theorizations of affect argue for a destabilization of humanist notions of the body and of the politics of voice and visibility. Mel Chen, for example, interrogates a liberal yet brutal humanism that accords liveliness and sentience—animacies—to human animals, nonhuman animals, and matter through a biopolitics of race, sex, and bodily ability. These are not a priori categories but rather are constructed with and through the epistemic projects that have functionalized their coherence. I seek to intersectionally pressure the assumed subjects of disability and also to address the constant *ontological* assembling of power and its effects. My intervention is less wedded to the elaboration of subjects and identities—and attempting to determine what their contents or attributes are—than to the elaboration of bodies and their affective modalities as they are modulated in control societies. Far from being postrace or postintersectional, this methodological demand is about redressing the epistemological bifurcation that has occurred around intersectional theorizing that has let

white feminists, especially those working on technoscience and (new) materialisms, off the hook and has, quite frankly, burdened women of color theorists and activists, most directly black feminist theorists, with the responsibility of adjudicating and defending the perceived successes or failures of intersectional scholarship.

DISCIPLINE AND CONTROL

Capacity and debility entail theorizing not only specific disciplinary sites but also broader techniques of social control, marking a shift in terms from the regulation of normativity (the internalization of self/other subject formation) to what Foucault calls the regularization of bodies, or what has been hailed "the age of biological control."[71] This is akin to what Giorgio Agamben perceives as the difference between regulating to produce order (discipline) and regulating disorder (security).[72] While Deleuze's techno-optimism leads him to proclaim rapid and complete transitions from discipline to control, Foucault is very clear about their braided and enmeshed historical and spatial modalities.[73] The oscillation between disciplinary societies and control societies, following Foucault's "apparatuses of security," both refracts and projects numerous tensions.[74] In control societies, Patricia Clough argues, bodies will not be captured or set free by re/presentation, but rather through affect and attention.[75] There is thus an affective differential, whereby the body is curated not only through disciplinary drilling but also through a composite of statistics, from normal/abnormal to variegation, fluctuation, modulation, and tweaking. Discrete and discontinuous sites of punishment—the prison, the mental hospital, the school—are extended spatially and temporally through continuous regimes of securitization driven by calculated risks and averages. While disciplinary power works to distinguish those who should be included from those who must be excluded or eliminated, security apparatuses have the "constant tendency to expand . . . new elements are constantly being integrated . . . allowing the development of ever-wider circuits" through the management of circulation determining not whether to include, but how.[76] Discipline is centripetal while apparatuses of security are centrifugal. Intense oscillation occurs between the following: subject/object construction and microstates of differentiation; difference between and difference within; the policing of profile and the patrolling of affect; will and capacity; agency and affect;

subject and body. And finally and, I believe, most important, between Althusserian interpellation (hey, you!) and an array of diverse switchpoints of the activation of the body, where bodies are positioned through openings and closings in order to ground practices of exploitation, extraction, dispossession, and expulsion commensurate with flexible modes of work and sociality.

How does disability function in control societies? Because there are gradations of capacity and debility in control societies—rather than the self-other production of being/not being—the distinction between disabled and non-disabled becomes fuzzier and blurrier. Disciplinary normalization, otherwise termed "normation" by Foucault, "goes from the norm to the final division between the normal and the abnormal" through "positing a model, an optimal model that is constructed in terms of a certain result"—the power of normalization versus normalization of power.[77] In security apparatuses, instead of distinguishing the normal from the abnormal, there are "different curves of normality . . . establishing an interplay between these different distributions of normality . . . acting to bring the most unfavorable in line with the more favorable. . . . The norm is an interplay of differential normalities."[78] Biopolitical apparatuses of control are invested in modulating a prolific range of affective bodily capacities and debilities—"differential normalities"—that invariably render rights-based interventions unable to fully apprehend the scenes of power. Disability identity is already part and parcel of a system of governing inclusion and exclusion, creating forms of what Robert McRuer calls "disability nationalism in crip times": liberal state and national recognition of people with disabilities that solicits the incorporation of certain disabilities into neoliberal economic circuits.[79] This conditional invitation latches onto and propagates celebratory claims of successful integration in order to continue to deplete resources from other, less acceptable bodies with disabilities. That is to say, the promoting and lauding of certain people with disabilities as markers of acceptance and progress ultimately serves to further marginalize and exclude most people with disabilities and serves also to sustain and create networks of debilitation in relation to these privileged disabled bodies. This is also what David Mitchell and Sharon Snyder analyze in *The Biopolitics of Disability*, in which they refer to the paradoxical means by which some disabled people gain entrance into late capitalist culture as "ablenationalism."[80]

This biopolitics of disability, I would further argue, is most efficient not just in the way it deploys some identities against others.[81] Rather, biopolitical control operates most perniciously and efficiently through reifying intersectional identity frames—these are frames that still hinge on discrete notions of inclusion and exclusion—as the most pertinent ones for political intervention, thus obfuscating forms of control that insidiously include in order to exclude, and exclude in order to include. Mitchell and Snyder state: "Control of the coordinates of bare biological life among citizens in market capitalism has been fashioned on the basis of systems of total oversight specific to disability and others occupying peripheral embodiments. . . . Disability is foundational to the development of cultural strategies in neoliberalism to 'seize hold of life in order to suppress it.' These strategies of seizure are the essence of bio-politics."[82]

The extraction and exploitation of body capacities and habituations pivot not only on the individual but more insidiously on the dividual. Foucault states that "discipline is a mode of individualization of multiplicities rather than something that constructs an edifice of multiple elements on the basis of individuals who are worked on as, first of all, individuals."[83] The individual is less a collection of multiplicities that form a whole than a stripping down or segregating of multiplicities, of "organizing a multiplicity, of fixing its points of implantation." Writing on vectors of control, Deleuze says of the hospital: "The new medicine 'without doctor or patient' . . . singles out potential sick people and subjects at risk, which in no way attests to individuation—as they say—but substitutes . . . the code of a dividual material to be controlled."[84] The code of dividual material, says Foucault, is generated by "security mechanisms [that] have to be installed around the random element inherent in a population of living beings so as to optimize a state of life."[85] Foucault explains that while discipline and control both work to maximize bodily extraction, unlike discipline, control does not work at "the level of the body itself: It is therefore not a matter of taking the individual at the level of individuality but, on the contrary, of using overall mechanisms and acting in such a way as to achieve overall states of equilibrium or regularity . . . a matter of taking control of life and the biological processes of man-as-species and of enduring that they are not disciplined, but regularized."[86]

The debate about discipline and control marks a shift in terms from the regulation of normativity (the internalization of self/other subject formation) to the regularization of bodies. Many relations between discipline (exclusion and inclusion) and control (modulation, tweaking) have been

proffered. As various overlapping yet progressive stages of market capitalism and governmentality, the telos of discipline to control might function as a recasting of neoliberal modernity. Certain bodies are more subject to persisting disciplinary institutions (prisons, mental hospitals, military service, torture, factory work), relegating disciplinary sites as part of the primitive in a modernist telos.[87] Deleuze as well proclaims that hacking is replacing strikes, but are strikes being relegated to the "global south"?[88] Two suppositions can be inferred here: one, the distinction between bodies subjected to discipline and those "incorporated" into control economies is in itself a racializing technology; two, the intersections between discipline and control, and their techniques of power, on various bodies is precisely the mechanism that funnels populations into being. Helpfully, Foucault's own formulations are more porous: as coexisting models and exercises of power; control as the epitome of a disciplinary society par excellence, in that disciplinary forms of power exceed their sites to reproduce everywhere; and finally, discipline as a form of control and as a response to the proliferation of control. Ilana Feldman, in her work on governmentality in Gaza, argues that what Foucault seeks to "identify is a shift in emphasis, where different epochs display greater reliance on certain of these technologies."[89] These shifts themselves, I would argue, suggest the supplementary and entwined configurations of power that are adaptable across spatial and temporal variations.

And, in fact, control societies operate covertly by deploying disciplinary power to keep or deflect our attention around the subjection of the subject, thus allowing control to manifest unhindered. I suggest therefore that disciplinary apparatuses function in part as foils for control mechanisms and not in teleological or developmentalist progressions. Here I am following the lead of Seb Franklin's theorization of control as episteme with operational logics, rather than a system of power wedded solely to specific periodizations and geographies. Franklin's analysis demonstrates that the *logic* of control—as a partitioning, measuring, computational technology—permeates predigital schemas of power as well as non-computer-based realms of the social.[90]

Modulation of affect is a critical technology of control. One prominent example of the medicalization of affect may well be that of depression. Nikolas Rose maintains that depression will become the number one disability in the United States and the United Kingdom by 2020.[91] While it

may well be the case, as Allan V. Horwitz and Jerome C. Wakefield have argued in *The Loss of Sadness: How Psychiatry Transformed Normal Sorrow into Depressive Disorder*, that the third and fourth editions of the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* (DSM-III and DSM-IV) have caused major depressive disorder to be overdiagnosed because of "insufficiently restrictive definitions," this expansion of depressed populations, or depressives, will not occur only through a widespread increase of depression, or an increase of its dispensation as a diagnosis, but also through the finessing of gradation of populations. In other words, it will not occur through the hailing and interpellation of depressed subjects—and a distinction between who is depressed and who is not—but rather through the evaluation and accommodation of degrees: To what degree is one depressed?[92] One is already instructed by television advertisements for psychotropic drugs such as Abilify, claiming that "two out of three people on anti-depressants still have symptoms" and offering a top-off medication to add to a daily med regime. Through this form of medical administration bodies are (1) drawn into a modulation of subindividual capacities (this would be the diverse switchpoints); (2) surveilled not on identity positions alone (though the recent work of Dorothy Roberts and Jonathan Metzl elaborates how this remains a trenchant issue) but through affective tendencies, informational body-as-data, and statistical probabilities—through populations, risk, and prognosis; and (3) further stratified across registers of the medical-industrial complex: medical debt, health insurance, state benefits, among other feedback loops into the profitability of debility.[93] How the disaggregation of depressed subjects into various states, intensities, and tendencies will change the dimensionality of disability remains an open prospect, but at the very least, it forces recognition of the limits of disability as a category. The disability at stake is an affective tendency of sorts as well as a mental state, and as such challenges the basis upon which disability rights frames have routed their representational (visibility) politics.

POSTHUMAN SUBALTERNS

In *The Right to Maim* I also foreground an intervention into the fields of posthumanism, object-oriented ontology, and new materialisms, insisting on an analysis of the subhuman or not quite human along with the cyborgian and the posthuman. I believe it is utterly crucial not to leave these

fields alone to play in their unraced genealogies. Critics of these fields have interrogated the relation between objects and objectification and how and why certain objects get to be subjects while others remain objectified and/or commodified, for example, Fred Moten on the para-ontology of the commodity in contrast to the flat ontology centered by object-oriented ontologists, where everything is leveled.[94] Mel Chen's work emphasizes the pros and cons of investing in notions of vibrant matter without concomitant attention to the material conditions of the production of that matter, not to mention deracinated and desexualized notions of vibrancy and agency. Disability theories and theorists in general have much fodder for challenging object-oriented ontologies, rarely having had the privilege of taking objects and human relations to them for granted. Eunjung Kim writes: "Instead of defending the fraught definition of 'human' as the basis of a 'moral' and caring world in order to valorize disabled existence, I suggest recognizing the intercorporeal ontology of objects, with the aim not of conferring inherent rights on them but, rather, of undermining efforts to deny a being humanness on the basis of object-like status."[95] Bodies understood as disabled, in particular cognitively disabled, have often been cast as inert passive objects rather than human subjects through a projection of "degraded objecthood" elevated over "qualified personhood."[96] Thus the mere status of objecthood itself cannot revitalize our relations to objects: our attitudes toward objects need to be reevaluated. In other words: *objects are vaunted unless they are humans who are considered objects (slaves, "vegetables")*.[97]

This recognition, in turn, has challenged the status of rational, agential, survivor-oriented politics based on the privileging of language capacity to make rights claims. Why? Because the inability to "communicate" functions as a significant determinant of mental or cognitive impairment (thereby regulating the human/animal distinction, as well as a distinction between humans and objects), thus destabilizing the centrality of the human capacity for thought and cognition. Language is multiple—for example, math and computation are considered to be languages, and nonhuman animals certainly have forms of communication that could be considered linguistic.[98] And yet "language" has been reduced to a singularly human capacity, though we might want to make distinctions between linguistic domains, the province of many nonhuman animals, unlike "language proper."[99] Not only is language the primary or even defining attribute

that separates humans from animals at this current historical juncture—and it is worth noting, following Jacques Derrida, that the distinction is differently articulated in different eras and areas of knowledge, variously as one of sentience, of capacity to feel pain, and of subjective capacity. As Mel Chen writes, the "linguistic criteria are established prominently and immutably in humans' terms, establishing human preeminence before the debates about the linguistic placement of humans' animal subordinates even begin."[100] So humans decide, based on the linguistic capacities defined by human language, that "language" forever appears as human language, and this language by definition creates humans as superior to nonhuman animals. There are thus two interventions needed: first, the understanding of language as running across species rather than articulating a human/nonhuman animal divide; and second, destabilizing what is often called the "primacy of language," interrogating the place of language itself. In doing so, language can enter multiplicity, and it can also be resituated as one intensification of a bodily capacity, one manner of many that the body can articulate itself, one platform out of many through which politics can enunciate, and finally one kind of matter. Language is not opposed to matter, but rather is matter—among many matters. If, according to posthumanist thinkers such as Manuel DeLanda and Karen Barad, language has been granted too much power, non-anthropomorphic conceptions of humans—that is, conceptions of humans that do not anthropomorphize themselves—are necessary to resituate language as one of many captures of the intensities of bodily capacities, an event of bodily assemblages rather than a performative act of signification.[101]

In an effort to open up capacity as a source of generative affective politics rather than only a closure around neoliberal demands, I would briefly like to return to Gayatri Spivak's "Can the Subaltern Speak?," perhaps unfashionably so.[102] In the context of debility, capacity, and disability, "Can the subaltern speak?" becomes not only a mandate for epistemological correctives. This haunting query also points to ontological and bodily capacity, as granting "voice" to the subaltern comes into tension with the need, in the case of the human/nonhuman animal distinction, to destabilize privileged modes of communication, representation, and language altogether. For Spivak, "subaltern consciousness" is a theoretical fiction. "Representation"—darstellen (portrait) and vetreten (proxy)—is an anthropocentric demand, and a philosophical and political privilege of the human—an overrepresentation, in

Sylvia Wynter's sense. Spivak's own ambivalence toward representation as an anthropocentric demand and as the philosophical privilege of the human surfaces momentarily, most significantly in the section discussing Sigmund Freud's seminal essay "A Child Is Being Beaten." Here I discern two realms where the dominance of language as a distinctly and exceptional human attribute remains yet to be established. The first, further drawing on psychoanalysis, is the prelinguistic realm of the child, where the analyst has to speak for the child, giving voice for and to the child. There is a paradox in Freud's statement of the speaker who cannot speak; or, the child is not yet a speaking subject, and therefore not a subject. Spivak grafts onto the "dangers run by Freud's discourse" another sentence that fumbles "our efforts to give the subaltern a voice in history": "White men are saving brown women from brown men." The second realm is where Spivak's impulse to push back against humanism appears, in a reference to the "archaic past," part of a history of repression of "a preoriginary space where human and animal were not yet differentiated."[103] The first instance is a triangulation that positions the hapless child/woman in need of rescue from two figures interchangeably rotating from savior to perpetrator. The second harks the prelinguistic or the semiotic and references the becoming of the subject in both psychic and historical terms.

It remains unclear to me whether for Spivak the problem is the epistemic enclosure in which the subaltern is stuck, or if representation itself is the problem, in which case she might ultimately be more aligned with Deleuze's (and Foucault's) project than (she) originally thought. Is she really so interested in saving the subject? Or is she already diagnosing the political impasse of representation, in that "speech," a normative function of humanist politics, is seemingly foreclosed for Spivak? The lexicon of debility and capacity saturates this text. In relation to the normative function of speech, for example, the subaltern is "mute."[104] The invocation of conditions of disability is crucial here, as Spivak in effect is making an argument about the debilitating (for many) and capacitating (for few) conditions of contemporary political, intellectual, and epistemological knowledge production practices. Undoing these knots between representation and language has led me to question why the subaltern is usually assumed to be necessarily human. If subalternity is by definition a relation of the un/non/subhuman that are excluded from dominant systems of circulation, deemed unfit for recognition or unable to be recognized, the subaltern, then, could be generously rethought as a nonhuman or inhuman configuration. In Spivak's schema, "woman" as a potential subaltern cannot simply be added to the list of pious items slated for rescue, remedied through an epistemological corrective; by extension, neither can "species" or nonhuman animals, or even "people with disabilities." In my torquing of this field-defying essay, the subaltern cannot speak because of the human/nonhuman animal divide that dictates that speech always shows up in an anthropocentric, and thus ableist, form; the subaltern cannot speak nor be heard within (phallo)logocentric, and thus anthropocentric, frames of legibility. To challenge geopolitically uninflected theorizations of post/humanism, I follow Wynter's formulation of the human as representationally overdetermined by one *genre* of human, through the ongoing restoration of humanism via the individual despite the force of biopolitical population construction. For Wynter, the project of a radical humanism has yet to be begun, much less left behind for posthumanist waters. Her project is not one of demanding inclusion into the Overrepresentation of Man as human, and therefore does not reassert the frames of temporality, progression, or priority. Rather, she insists on the multiplicity of humans and human forms that have yet to be known, a revolutionary humanism with deep commitments to those entities that are instrumentally denied humanity in order for it to be sustained.[105] The Overrepresentation of Man as human is thus the closed system that can only project onto/as the subaltern what Spivak calls the "itinerary of Man." Reading Spivak and Wynter together reveals the speaking subject of politics and history is a genre of the human that the subaltern defies, populated by nonhuman entities as well as humans produced as objects, as property, as animals, as subhumans unworthy of political consideration.

Therefore, disability studies, posthumanism, and critical animal studies may perhaps articulate a common interest in a nonanthropocentric, interspecies vision of affective politics. While disability studies has diligently refuted the negative slurs referencing animality unleashed against those with cognitive and physical disabilities, it has, at times, unwittingly reinforced a privileging of the human in doing so.[105] Noting that disability activists argue for rights for those disabled who are "lacking certain highly valued abilities like rationality and physical independence," Sunaura Taylor asks, "How can disability studies legitimately exclude animals for these reasons without contradiction? I argue that disability studies has

accidentally created a framework of justice that can no longer exclude other species."[107] The burgeoning field of critical animal studies is thus also a part of the endeavor to situate human capacities within a range of capacities of species as opposed to reifying their singularity. Following Taylor's critique, it is also necessarily a site where a persistent examination of the entwinement of race and animality cannot be elided. Critical posthumanist or inhumanist theorizing questions the boundaries between human and nonhuman, matter and discourse, technology and body, and interrogates the practices through which these boundaries are constituted, stabilized, and destabilized. It, however, can also be the case that "the posthuman," as Alexander Weheliye notes, "frequently appears as little more than the white liberal subject in techno-informational guise."[108] Provocatively suggesting that "perhaps the 'post'human is not a temporal location but a geographic one," Zakiyyah Iman Jackson asks: "Might there be a (post)humanism that does not privilege European Man and its idiom? . . . Is it possible that the very subjects central to posthumanist inquiry—the binarisms of human/animal, nature/culture, animate/inanimate, organic/inorganic—find their relief outside of the epistemological locus of the West?"[109] Dan Goodley, Rebecca Lawthom, and Katherine Runswick Cole, however, call for a "posthuman disability studies," arguing that disabled bodies epitomize the ethical reaches of posthumanist discourses that challenge the stability and centrality of the human form.[110] So, even as scholars rightly challenge romanticized versions of posthumanism, these challenges betray an assumption that the posthuman always refers to an idealized humanness.

TO WHATEVER EXTENT LIVING IS, can be, has been, or continues to be a maximal output of energy and capacity with a minimal set of resources, many populations are engaged at some moment, if not continuously, with their slow deaths. It might be too obvious to state that things simply "do not get better." More perniciously, one could suggest, as does Geeta Patel, that finance capital enforces repeated mandatory investments in our own slow deaths, continually reproducing the conditions of possibility that enable the sustained emergence and proliferation of debility, capacity, and disability. Furthermore, the proliferation of these modalities happens not only via neoliberal subjects but also through affective tendencies and inhuman economies of temporality, spatiality, and corporeality. The chapters that follow offer analyses of trans becoming in relation to affect and the

matter of race; U.S. imperialism and the effect of belated and disavowed debilitation on populations produced as "elsewhere"; Israel's project of rehabilitation through the spatial, affective, and corporeal debilitation of Palestine; and the sovereign right to maim wielded by Israel in relation to the right to kill.

[1]

Bodies with New Organs

Becoming Trans, Becoming Disabled

"Transgender rights are the civil rights issue of our time." So stated Vice President Joe Biden just one week before the November 2012 election. Months earlier, President Barack Obama had publicly declared his support for gay marriage, sending mainstream LGBT organizations and queer liberals into a tizzy.[1] It was an unexpected comment for an election season, and nearly inaudibly rendered during a conversation with a concerned mother of Miss Trans New England. Yet Biden's remark, encoded in the rhetoric of recognition, seemed logical from a well-established civil rights era teleology: first the folks of color, then the homosexuals, now the trans folk.[2] Biden's proclamation could be one genesis of the "transgender tipping point," a term coined by *Time* magazine in June 2014 to delineate a plethora of (positive) media representation of transgender people. Indeed, a slew of antidiscrimination laws were passed under Obama's presidency; a national debate emerged about women's colleges and the presence of trans students; accessibility to gender-neutral bathrooms was lauded and also abhorred; *Orange Is the New Black* brought Laverne Cox and other trans actors to widespread public attention; and Bruce Jenner came out as Caitlyn.

There were also unprecedented numbers of trans women of color, mainly black trans women, murdered during this same tipping point periodization.

The narrative of the tipping point feeds into the post–civil rights era story about the linear progression of the bestowal of rights. What happens to conventional understandings of "women's rights" in this telos? The "transgender question" puts into crisis the framing of women's rights as human rights by pushing further the relationships between gender normativity and access to rights and citizenship. I could note, as many have, that failing an intersectional analysis of these movements, we are indeed left with a very partial portrait of who benefits and how from this according of rights, not to mention their tactical invocation within this period of liberalism whereby, as Elizabeth Povinelli argues, "potentiality has been domesticated."[3] As Jin Haritaworn and C. Riley Snorton argue, "It is necessary to interrogate how the uneven institutionalization of women's, gay, and trans politics produces a transnormative subject, whose universal trajectory of coming out/transition, visibility, recognition, protection, and self-actualization largely remains uninterrogated in its complicities and convergences with biomedical, neoliberal, racist, and imperialist projects."[4] In relation to this uneven institutionalization, Haritaworn and Snorton remark that trans of color positions are "barely conceivable." The conundrum here, as elsewhere, involves measuring the political efficacy of arguing for inclusion within and for the same terms of recognition that rely on such elisions. Desires for trans of color positions to become conceivable necessarily deploy their bare inconceivability to critique and upend that which seems conceivable.[5]

Biden's remarks foreshadow the steep cost of the intelligibility of transgender identity within national discourses and legal frames of recognition. Does his acknowledgment of transgender rights signal the uptake of a new variant of homonationalism—a "trans(homo)nationalism"? Or is transgender identity a variation of processes of citizenship and nationalism through disciplinary normativization rather than a variation of homonationalism? In either instance, such hailings, I argue, generate new figures of citizenship through which the successes of rights discourses will produce new biopolitical failures—trans of color, for one instance. Susan Stryker and Aren Z. Aizura call the "production of transgender whiteness" a "process of value extraction from bodies of color" that occurs both nationally and transnationally.[6] Thinking of this racial dynamic as a process of value extraction highlights the impossibility of a rights platform that incorporates trans of

color positions, since their inconceivability is a precondition to the emergence of the rights project, not to mention central to its deployment and successful integration into national legibility. Adding biopolitical capacity to the portrait, Aizura writes that this trans citizenship entails "fading into the population . . . but also the imperative to be 'proper' in the eyes of the state: to reproduce, to find proper employment; to reorient one's 'different' body into the flow of the nationalized aspiration for possessions, property [and] wealth."[7] This trans(homo)nationalism is therefore capacitated, even driven, not only by the abjection of bodies unable to meet these proprietary racial and gendered mandates of bodily comportment, but also by the concomitant marking of those abjected bodies as debilitated. The debilitating and abjecting are co-substancing processes.

In light of this new but not entirely surprising assimilation of gender difference through nationalism, I want to complicate the possibilities of accomplishing such trans normativization by foregrounding a different historical trajectory: one not hailed or celebrated by national LGBT groups or the media, nor explicitly theorized in most queer or trans theory. This is the move from the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to the present moment of trans hailing by the U.S. state.[8] Historically and contemporaneously, the nexus of disability and trans has been fraught, especially for trans bodies that may resist alliances with people with disabilities in no small part because of long struggles against stigmatization and pathologization that may be reinvoked through such an affiliation. But stigmatization is only part of the reason for this thwarted connection. Neoliberal mandates regarding productive, capacitated bodies entrain trans bodies to re-create an able body not only in terms of gender and sexuality but also in terms of economic productivity and the development of national economy.[9] Thus, trans relation to disability is not simply one of phobic avoidance of stigma; it is also about trans bodies being recruited, in tandem with many other bodies, for a more generalized transformation of capacitated bodies into viable neoliberal subjects.

Many trans bodies are reliant on medical care, costly pharmacological and technological interventions, legal protections, and public accommodations from the very same institutions and apparatuses that functionalize gender normativities and create systemic exclusions. How do people who rely on accessing significant resources within a political economic context, where the possessive individual is the basis for rights claims—including the right to medical care—disrupt the very models on which they depend?

This dependence is required in order to make the claims that, in the case of trans people, enable trans people to realize themselves as trans in the first place. I explore this conundrum for trans bodies through the ambivalent and vexed relationship to disability in three respects: (1) the legal apparatus of the ADA, which sets the scene for a contradictory status to disability and the maintenance of gender normativity as a requisite for disabled status, one organized through hierarchies of race; (2) the fields of disability studies and trans studies, which both pivot on certain exceptionalized figures that may delimit their entanglements; and (3) political organizing priorities and strategies that partake in transnormative forms not only of passing but also of what I call "piecing," a recruitment into neoliberal forms of fragmentation of the body for capitalist profit.[10] Finally, I offer a speculative imagined affiliation between disability and trans, "becoming trans," which seeks to link disability, trans, racial, and interspecies discourses to acknowledge porous boundaries constitutive of the overwhelming force of ontological multiplicity, attuned to the perpetual differentiation of variation and the multiplicity of affirmative becomings.[11] What kinds of assemblages appear that might refuse to isolate trans as one kind of specific or singular variant of disability and disability as one kind of singular variant of trans?[12] What kind of political and scholarly alliances might potentiate when each takes up and acknowledges the inhabitations and the more generalized conditions of the other, creating genealogies that read both as implicated within the same assemblages of power? The focus here is not on epistemological correctives but on ontological irreducibilities that transform the fantasy of discreteness of categories not through their disruption but, rather, through their dissolution via multiplicity. Rather than produce conceptual interventions that map onto the political or produce a differently political rendering of its conceptual moorings, reflected in the debate regarding transnormativity and trans of color conceivability, I wish to offer a generative, speculative reimagining of what can be signaled by the political.

DISABILITY LAW AND TRANS DISCRIMINATION

The legal history that follows matters because it both reflects and enshrines the contradictory relationship that trans bodies may have to resisting pathological medicalization yet needing to access benefits through the medical-industrial complex. The explicit linkages to the trans body as a

body rendered disabled and/or rehabilitated from disability have been predominantly routed through debates about gender identity disorder (GID). Arriving in the third edition of the American Psychiatric Association's *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* (DSM-III, published in 1980), on the heels of the DSM-II depathologization of homosexuality in 1974, GID was eliminated in the DSM-5, released in May 2013, and replaced with the diagnosis gender dysphoria.[13] These complex debates have focused largely on a series of explicit inclusions and exclusions of GID in relation to the DSM and the ADA. The inclusion of GID in 1980 and its focus on childhood behavior were largely understood as a compensatory maneuver for the deletion of homosexuality, thus instating surveillance mechanisms that would perhaps prevent homosexuality.[14] In contrast, a notable passage in the ADA specified the exclusion of "gender identity disorders not resulting from physical impairments" as a disability—couched in an exclusionary clause that included "transvestitism, transsexualism, pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism, . . . 'other sexual disorders,'" and completely arbitrary "conditions" such as compulsive gambling, kleptomania, pyromania, and substance use disorders involving illegal drugs.[15] This clause was largely understood (unlike the specific exclusion of homosexuality) as an entrenchment of the pathologization of GID. This deliberate inclusion of the terms of exclusion is a crucial piece of the story, in part because to date the ADA is "the most extensive civil rights law to address bodily norms."[16]

Given the ADA's hodgepodge of excluded conditions, many of which carry great social stigma and/or are perceived as criminal activity, most commentators concur with L. Camille Herbert's sentiment that "while one might argue for the exclusion of certain conditions from the definition of disability as justified by not wanting to pathologize certain individuals and conditions, this does not appear to have been the motivation of Congress."[17] The process by which Congress arrived at these exclusions was marred by moral panic discourses about diseased and debilitated bodies, discourses that the ADA was produced in part to ameliorate. Former senator Jesse Helms (R-NC), writes R. Nick Gorton, "raised the specter that the law would provide disability protections to numerous politically unpopular groups," concluding that most people who are HIV-positive are drug addicts, homosexuals, bisexuals, pedophiles, or kleptomaniacs, among others, and that the exclusion was enacted "as a direct result of Helms's efforts."[18] Noting that the ADA "unequivocally" endorses the use of the DSM in recognizing conditions of disability, Kari Hong argues that "understanding why a

dozen conditions were removed becomes an important task," as the exclusion not only disqualifies certain conditions from consideration as a disability but also "isolate[s] particular conditions from medical authority." Hong also points out that Helms's "bifurcation of disability into 'good' (wheelchairs) and 'bad' (transvestitism) categories echoes a disturbing misuse of medicine."[19] Ultimately, Congress capitulated and sacrificed these excluded groups in exchange for holding onto the protection of another vilified "minority" group: individuals with HIV.[20] This move of course insists on problematic bifurcations, perhaps strategically so, between individuals diagnosed with GID and individuals diagnosed with HIV.

Thus, Kevin Barry argues, "The ADA is a moral code, and people with GID its moral castaways." He adds that GID "sits at the uneasy crossroads of pathology and difference,"[21] an uneasy crossroads that continues to manifest (especially now as GID has been eliminated in the *DSM*-5).[22] Adrienne L. Hiegel elaborates this point at length, with particular emphasis on how this exclusion recodes the labor capacities of the transsexual body. In segmenting off "sexual behavior disorders" and "gender identity disorders" from the ADA's definition of disability, the "Act carves out a new class of untouchables. . . . By leaving open a space of permissive employer discrimination, the Act identifies the sexual 'deviant' as the new pariah, using the legal machinery of the state to mark as outsiders those whose noncompliant body renders them unfit for full integration into a working community."[23]

From this perspective, the ADA does less to change the ethical and symbolic weight of nonnormative corporeality and disability itself; instead, it reifies standards of bodily capacity and debility through the reproduction of gender normativity as integral to the productive potential of the disabled body. Further, the disaggregation, and thus the potential deflation, of political and social alliances between homosexuality, transsexuality, and individuals with HIV is necessary to the solidification of this gender normativity, solicited in exchange for the conversion of disability from a socially maligned and excluded status to a version of liberal acknowledgment, inclusion, and incorporation. The modern seeds of what Nicole Markotic and Robert McRuer call "crip nationalism"—the hailing of some disabilities as socially productive for national economies and ideologies that then further marginalize other disabilities—are evident here. The tolerance of the "difference" of disability is negotiated through the disciplining

of the body along other normative registers of sameness.[24] And further, what Sharon Snyder and David Mitchell term "ablenationalism"—that is, the ableist contours of national inclusion and registers of productivity—ironically underwrites the ADA even as the ADA serves as groundbreaking legislation to challenge it. Snyder and Mitchell describe ablenationalism as the "implicit assumption that minimum levels of corporeal, intellectual, and sensory capacity, in conjunction with subjective aspects of aesthetic appearance, are required of citizens seeking to access the 'full benefits' of citizenship."[25] In reorganizing the terms of disability, ablenationalism redirects the pathos and stigma of disability onto different registers of bodily deviance and defectiveness, in this particular instance that of gender nonnormativity. In that sense, crip nationalism goes hand in hand with ablenationalism; indeed, ablenationalism is its progenitor.

The specific details of the exclusionary clause might gesture toward the multifaceted reasons that, as Snyder and Mitchell observe, "queer, transsexual, and intersexed peoples . . . exist at the margins of disability discourse."[26] It is also worth remembering, pace Hortense Spillers, that gender normativity coagulates through biopolitical control of reproduction, civilizational discourses, and racial hierarchies.[27] Therefore, whiteness is not a by-product of this cohesion, but rather constitutive of the consolidation of gender-normative yet disabled difference. Spillers argues that debilitation of slavery involved not only mutilation and dismemberment but also the denial of the gendering constitutive of legitimate kinship, whereby "one is neither female, nor male, as both subjects are taken into 'account' as quantities."[28] She continues:

> In the historic outline of dominance, the respective subject-positioning of "male" and "female" adhere to no symbolic integrity. At a time when current critical discourses appear to compel us more and more decidedly toward gender "undecidability," it would appear reactionary, if not dumb, to insist on the integrity of female/male gender. But undressing these conflations of meaning, as they appear under the rule of dominance, would restore, as figurative possibility, not only Power to the Female (for Maternity), but also Power to the Male (for Paternity). We would gain, in short, the *potential* for gender differentiation as it might express itself along a range of stress points, including human biology in its intersection with the project of culture.[29]

The potential for gender differentiation *in the first instance* is already the potential—indeed the capacitation—of whiteness; the capacity to lean into gender "undecidability," the province of that same whiteness.

It is not simply that the ADA excludes GID and, by extension, trans from recognition as potentially disabling. Rather, transsexuality—and likely those versions of transsexuality that are deemed also improperly raced and classed—is understood as "too disabled" to be rehabilitated into citizenship, or not properly disabled enough to be recoded for labor productivity. Further, the ADA arbitrates the distinctions between homosexuality and transsexuality along precisely these pathologized lines. Contrary to what Hiegel claims, the sexual "deviant" is hardly the "new pariah." Rather, there is a new sexual deviant in town, demarcated from an earlier one. Indeed, the enthusiastic embracing of the ADA by some gay and lesbian activists and policy makers for the exclusion of homosexuality as a "sexual behavior disorder" did not go unnoticed by trans activists who felt differently about the ADA.[30] Proclivities toward queer ableism are therefore predicated on the ADA's parsing homosexuality from other "sexual disorders," as well as in the histories of political organizing. Zach Strassburger describes the process of homonationalism by noting that "as the gay and lesbian rights movement gained steam, the transgender movement grew more inclusive to cover those left behind by the gay and lesbian movement's focus on its most mainstream members and politically promising plaintiffs."[31] Given the political history of parsing trans from queer through the maintenance of gender normativity, can disability function proactively and productively, as a conversion or translation of the stigma through which trans can demarcate its distance from aspects of LGBT organizing that are increasingly normative?[32]

I offer this brief historical overview to lay out the stakes for the debate between demedicalizing trans bodies (favoring the use of gender discrimination law to adjudicate equality claims) and successfully using disability law to access crucial medical care. What is evident from these discussions is that vociferous debates about the utility of the medical model in trans jurisprudence persist. Strassburger, who argues for an "expanded vision of disability" based on the social model that could be applied for trans rights, notes nonetheless that the medical model of trans has often been more successful than sex and gender discrimination and sexual orientation protection. He contends that in its emphasis on demedicalization, the transgender rights movement, despite reluctantly admitting the success of

medical strategy, ignores the pragmatic aspects of litigation. Strassburger also notes that "demedicalization would mirror the gay rights movement's very successful efforts to frame gayness as good rather than a disease."[33]

For others, the debate between medicalization and demedicalization forestalls a broader conversation about access to proper medical care, one that has been foregrounded by feminist struggles over reproductive rights, for example.[34] Proponents of the use of disability law further argue that difficult access to medical care is not a complete given for all disenfranchised populations. For example, Alvin Lee argues that the "unique aspects of incarceration and prison health care justify and indeed compel the use of the medical model when advocating for trans prisoners' right to sex reassignment surgery."[35] Lee notes that the usual bias against lower-income populations in the use of the medical model does not apply to the "right-to-care" prison context, where medical evidence is the best way to demonstrate serious and necessary rather than elective health care, given the "general principle that individual liberties should be restricted in prison."[36] Other legal practitioners such as Jeannie J. Chung and Dean Spade are curious about the success of social models of disability in transgender litigation. Spade, for example, has carefully elaborated his ambivalence about the use of disability law and the medical model in relation to his firm social justice commitment to the demedicalization of trans, arguing for a "multi-strategy approach."[37]

TRANS EXCEPTIONALISM: PASSING AND PIECING

In addition to the robust debates about jurisprudence on trans and disability, transgender studies and disability studies are often thought of as coming into being in the early 1990s in the U.S. academy, a periodization that reflects a shift in practices of recognition, economic utility, and social visibility that obscures prior scholarship. In terms of trans, for example, Stryker and Aizura note that "to assert the emergence of transgender studies as a field only in the 1990s rests on a set of assumptions that permit a differentiation between one kind of work on 'transgender phenomena' and another, for there had of course been a great deal of academic, scholarly, and scientific work on various forms of gender variance long before the 1990s." Among the various historical changes they list as significant to this emergence are "new political alliances forged during the AIDS crisis, which brought sexual and gender identity politics into

a different sort of engagement with the biomedical and pharmaceutical establishments."[38]

This emergence of disability and trans identity as intersectional coordinates required exceptionalizing both the trans body and the disabled body to convert the debility of a nonnormative body into a form of social and cultural capacity, whether located in state recognition, identity politics, market economies, the medical-industrial complex, academic knowledge production, subject positioning, or all of these. As a result, both fields of study—trans studies and disability studies—suffer from a domination of whiteness and contend with the normativization of the acceptable and recognizable subject. The disabled subject is often a body with a physical "impairment." In trans identity, the more recently emergent trajectory of female-to-male (FTM) enlivened by access to hormones, surgical procedures, and prosthetics has centralized a white trans man subject. While the disabled subject has needed to reclaim forms of debility to exceptionalize the transgression and survivorship of that disability, the transnormative subject views the body as endlessly available for hormonal and surgical manipulation and becoming, a body producing toward ableist norms. Further, transgender does not easily signal within "conventional notions of disability" because it is not a "motor, sensory, psychiatric, or cognitive impairment" or a chronic illness.[39]

Eli Clare, a trans man with cerebral palsy, has generated perhaps the most material on the specific epistemological predicaments of the disabled trans subject or the trans disabled subject, providing much-needed intersectional analysis. Clare writes of the ubiquity of this sentiment: "I often hear trans people—most frequently folks who are using, or want to use medical technology to reshape their bodies—name their trans-ness a disability, a birth defect."[40] Here Clare emphasizes the trans interest in a cure for the defect, a formulation that has been politically problematized in disability rights platforms, reinforces ableist norms, and alienates potential convivialities: "To claim our bodies as defective, and to pair defect with cure . . . disregards the experiences of many disabled people."[41] Disability here is not only the "narrative prosthesis" through which the trans body will overcome and thus resolve its debility, but also the "raw material out of which other socially disempowered communities make themselves visible."[42] Seen through this mechanism of resource extraction, disability is the disavowed materiality of a trans embodiment that abstracts and thus effaces this materiality from its self-production.

Toby Beauchamp adds to the conversation about cure the notion of concealment via legal (identity documents) and medical intervention, stating: "Concealing gender deviance is about much more than simply erasing transgender status. It also necessitates altering one's gender presentation to conform to white, middle-class, able-bodied, heterosexual understandings of normative gender."[43] The cure, then, revolves around rehabilitation to multiple social norms. Beauchamp further notes that the process of diagnosis and treatment inevitably reinforces this rehabilitation: "Medical surveillance focuses first on individuals' legibility *as* transgender, and then, following medical interventions, on their ability to *conceal* any trans status or deviance."[44] While access to adequate and sensitive health care for trans people can be a daunting if not foreclosed process, emergent conversations on "transgender health" can also function to reassert neoliberal norms of bodily capacity and debility.[45] The transnormative subject might categorically reject the potential identification and alliance with disability, despite the two sharing an intensive relation to medicalization, and perhaps because of the desire for rehabilitation and an attendant indebtedness to medicalization. Clare avers that while the "disability rights movement fiercely resists the medicalization of bodies" to refuse the collapsing of the body "into mere medical condition," in his estimation "we haven't questioned the fundamental relationship between trans people and the very idea of diagnosis. Many of us are still invested in the ways we're medicalized."[46]

Even in politically progressive narrations of transgender embodiment, for example, an unwitting ableism and the specter of disability as intrinsic disenfranchisement often linger as by-products of the enchantment with the transformative capacities of bodies. For example, Eva Hayward's take on the "Cripple" toggles a very tenuous line between the "Cripple" as a metaphor of regeneration and the crippling effects of amputation.[47] Likewise, Bailey Kier, describing an instance of fishes' ability to transsex in response to toxic endocrine-disrupting chemicals (EDCs), wonders if such transformations are a "technology beyond our grasp," disregarding the uneven biopolitical distribution of such toxins that render his desires for a global "embracing [of] our shared transsex" violently idealistic: "EDCs are part of the food, productive and re/productive chain of non-human and human life and we will need to devise ways, just like fish, to adapt to their influence."[48]

Emerging identifications with "transability" also have a vexed relationship to disability: seemingly positive on the outset, potentially violently

idealizing and appropriative upon closer examination. Transabled individuals, linked to the diagnosis of bodily integrity identity disorder, are those who desire amputation, paralysis, blindness, deafness, and use of wheelchairs, superglue, cotton stuffed in ears, personal alarms, ototoxic drugs, surgeries to sever the auditory nerve, leg braces, blindfolds, and other forms of body modification and alteration to simulate certain conditions of disability.[49] According to both Bethany Stevens and Anne Lawrence, the analogy of transability to transgender is made largely because of the alignments of desires for surgical modification and reconciliation of internal identity and external embodiment, and early childhood onset of a sense of being "trapped in the wrong body."[50] Nikki Sullivan's work excavates the (ultimately unhelpful) taxonomic work entailed in producing the "wannabee" as a devotee who mistakes the object of desire for the desiring self/subject. Such conclusions that the wannabee or the transablist mistakes desire for a disabled other as a desire for disabling the self have been deduced in large part due to comparisons with the understanding of transsexuality as a sexual disorder where one is aroused by seeing oneself as the opposite gender.[51]

Saturated within the resonant discourses of "being in the wrong body," "wanting to feel whole," and "transitioning" into being disabled, transablists seek bodily modification that is considered pathological because of its purported decapacitation of the body. Transabled individuals claim that it is not disability per se that is desired but the reconciliation of body image with the body. The sources of what is otherwise constituted as a disability are perceived as enhancing, capacitating, and enlivening bodily attributes. The "disability," then, is located in the able body, a debilitation due to the incongruence of the "whole" body in relation to the desired body that is missing a limb or that cannot walk, hear, or see. "Pretending" in this context—the act of passing as disabled—is not simply about a transition from "being able-bodied" to "being disabled." It is about radically recapacitating the body through means otherwise considered to be profoundly debilitating.[52] Given the overlaps between transgender and transableism, the ableist (positive) terms with which some trans body modification is hailed seem to then render transabled desires for body modification to be cast in negative terms. What transability might engender is a body that not only scrambles hierarchies of organ ordering, divesting from normative attachments of capacity to various organs, but also refuses the capacitation of the able-oriented model altogether.

In her research on transability, Stevens notes that generally, only physical impairments are desired, reifying a hierarchy of disability.[53] Sometimes called parasites by people with disabilities, transablists raise questions about what the boundaries of disability are, how (a "real") disability is defined, and whether probing about the authenticity of disability is an ethical and fair endeavor. Stevens conjectures that transablists may well be dealing with a mental health issue, which then "makes them a part of the disability community but perhaps not in the way that they want." She is, however, ultimately not persuaded by the plight of transablists: "The proximity to a devotee-type fetishization of disability, however, makes the acceptance of transability as even a mental health issue a bit too muddled."[54] This assessment, however, does not detract from a certain form of capacitation claimed by the process and desire of becoming disabled.

There is a third element here that produces disability as the disavowed material co-substance of trans bodies. While there are understandable desires to avoid stigma and, as the ADA demonstrates, a demand for bodies with disabilities to integrate into a capitalist economy as productive bodies, the third factor involves aspirational forms of trans exceptionalism, one version of which seeks rehabilitation, cure, and concealment. However, this exceptionalism is not only about passing as gender normative; it is also about inhabiting an exceptional trans body—which is a different kind of trans exceptionalism. A new transnormative citizen is predicated not on passing but on "piecing," galvanized through mobility, transformation, regeneration, flexibility, and the creative concocting of the body. Trans piecing performs medicalization as strategic embodiment. Regarding piecing as an elemental aspect of neoliberal biomedical approaches to bodies with disabilities, now globalized to all bodies, Mitchell and Snyder argue that the body has become "a multi-sectional market" distinct from Fordist regimes that divided workers from each other: "We are now perpetual members of an audience encouraged to experience our bodies in pieces. . . . Whereas disabled people were trained to recognize their disabled parts as definitely inferior, late capitalism trains everyone to separate their good from bad—a form of alienation that feeds the market's penchant for 'treating' our parts separately. The body becomes a terrain of definable localities, each colonized by its particular pathologies dictated by the medicalized marketplace."[55] While this partitioning of the body is not a recent emergence—there is a long history of bodily compartmentalization as a prerequisite for capitalist production—this piecing is not only about enhancing productive

capacities but also about extending the body experientially and extracting value not just from bodies, but also from body parts and particles.[56]

In this economy of alienated parts, piecing becomes a prized capacity, a mark of manifesting "the body as entrepreneurial enterprise," to paraphrase Foucault.[57] Jack Halberstam observes that "the transgender body has emerged as futurity itself, a kind of heroic fulfillment of post-modern promises of gender flexibility."[58] Halberstam is cautious about overinvesting in gender fluidity as transgressive capacity, noting that market economies already capitalize on "flexibility" as the hallmark of neoliberal economic productivity. But which transgender body (bodies?) is actually understood as "futurity itself"? This suturing of trans to exceptional futurity and the potential that the future offers is the new transnormative body. Again, this is not the transnormative body that passes but the transnormative body that "pieces," the commodification not of wholeness or of rehabilitation but of plasticity, crafting parts from wholes, bodies without and with new organs. Piecing thus appears transgressive when in fact it is constitutive not only of transnormativity but also of aspects of neoliberal market economies.

To situate this trans body that is "futurity itself," it might be helpful to turn to trans organizing. Importantly, strategic interfaces between disability law and trans discrimination are also mirrored in growing political organizing and alliances between the two groups. One example includes a coalition of trans and persons with disabilities organized at the University of California, Santa Barbara, to jointly address the gendered and ableist expectations governing access, space, and surveillance in public restrooms called People in Search of Safe and Accessible Restrooms (PISSAR).[59] As another example, the Transgender Law Center in San Francisco has issued an activist handbook titled *Peeing in Peace* that uses disability-informed arguments for gender-neutral public toilets.

Along with a distinction between the disability rights movement and disability justice organizing maintained by activists such as Mia Mingus (discussed in the introduction), one should also retain a distinction between the transgender rights movement and trans justice organizing. TransJustice, one of the two major initiatives of the Audre Lorde Project in New York City, is a political group created by and for trans and gender-nonconforming people of color. TransJustice works to mobilize its communities and allies into action on the pressing political issues that trans of color folks face, including better access to jobs, housing, and education; the



FIG. 1.1. A blue gender-neutral bathroom sign at the University of California, Irvine, September 2014. Source: Reuters.

need for trans-sensitive health care, HIV-related services, and employment training programs; and resisting police, government, and anti-immigrant violence. The members of TransJustice tend to be African American and Latino working-class youth, and most are male-to-female (MTF). The convergence of racial identity and MTF seems significant and hardly incidental. Everything available on economic indicators, transgender health, incarceration, employment, street violence, and education amply demonstrates that trans women of color, especially black trans women, are massively disenfranchised in relation to other trans bodies and that the gulf between them and (white) FTMs is vast. Data are sparse but stark: "In 2003, 14 murders of transpeople were reported in the U.S., and 38 worldwide. Most were MTF and most were people of color."[60] The major concerns of TransJustice members cluster around access to school, employment, welfare provisions, and uncontaminated and inexpensive drugs and treatments—hormones, fillers, and surgeries. Many articulate their awareness of trans identity occurring simultaneously with a realization that they were attracted to the "wrong" sex (so not only or necessarily that they were in the "wrong" body). They desire to pass as beautiful, feminine, sexy. While a trans politics might render such forms of passing either a validation of a radical identity or a version of assimilation, misrecognition, or "selling out," for these members it is often entwined with, albeit obliquely, avoiding police harassment, community stigmatization, and familial

rejection. Their engagement with the medical-industrial complex and with desires for transformative embodiment is not necessarily or only victorious, empowered by choice, or ultimately capacity building. Medicalization can be experienced as transformative, capacitating, debilitating, or all of the above, not to mention exclusionary.[61] They do not embody "futurity itself"; rather, their bodies can be read as sites of intensive struggle (medical, educational, employment, legal, social) over who indeed does get to embody—and experience—futurity, and who as a result will be cast off as the collateral damage of such strivings to capture the essence of the future.

Kris Hayashi, former director of the Audre Lorde Project, elaborates the emphases of trans organizing in New York City in general and TransJustice specifically:

> In New York City, TGNC [trans and gender-nonconforming] youth of color and low-income youth in the West Village neighborhood face ongoing violence and harassment at the hands of the police, as well as from residents who are primarily White and middle class to upper class. As a result, FIERCE!, an organization led and run primarily by TGNC low-income and homeless youth of color, prioritizes issues of police brutality and violence, as well as gentrification. TransJustice, a project of ALP [the Audre Lorde Project] that is led and run by TGNC people of color, has prioritized issues of unemployment and education access due to high rates of unemployment (60%–70%) facing TGNC people of color. Also in New York, a coalition of organizations and groups including TransJustice, Welfare Warriors, and the LGBT Community Center's Gender Identity Project have prioritized efforts to end the regular harassment and discrimination faced by TGNC people seeking to gain access to public assistance. Finally, many TGNC groups led primarily by people of color and low-income communities have also prioritized ending the U.S. war on terrorism, both in the United States and abroad.[62]

The work of TransJustice situates the vexed relations to futurity that its trans constituency must mediate in terms of quotidian survival.[63] In doing so, TransJustice activists expose how transnormativity functions through the privilege of whiteness, foregrounding a critical approach to the racializing technologies of trans identity. Further, the link that TransJustice makes to domestic and transnational manifestations of the war on terror rests upon two premises: one, the intrinsic imbrication of the global war on

terror and racial capitalism in the United States (gentrification, unemployment, access to education, public assistance); two, the production of trans identity, activism, and politics that is not only sensitive to but intertwined with a transnational register accountable for and working against a U.S.-centric trans-homonationalism. Their analyses centralize who is *able to be* hailed/recognized as disabled and is *able to be* hailed/recognized as transgender as a function of state and legal recognition that is often elusive for their bodies, demonstrating that capacity—not only to pass but to piece—rather than primarily debility, deviance, victimhood, ostracization, or nonnormativity is at the center of these projects. The trans normative body that pieces, then, also passes, not as gender-normative male or female, but as trans. Susan Stryker and Nikki Sullivan, elaborating on this capacitation through piecing, write: "Our research . . . leads us toward a new understanding of bodily integration, one predicated not on the organic integrity of the human organism, but rather on the body's suitability for integration, its ability to be integrated as a biopolitical resource into a larger sociotechnical field, or into an apparatus such as the State."[64] In other words, they suggest a critique of the rehabilitation model as intrinsically a return to wholeness. Integration through piecing, rather than wholeness through passing, becomes a valued asset in control societies. Stryker and Sullivan continue: "The integrity of the body—that is, the ability of the body to be *integrated*—is thus, paradoxically, dependent on its enfleshment as always already torn, rent, incomplete, and unwhole."[65] This capacity to "integrate" oneself—not to pass but to piece—thus mediates the production as well as the lived experiences of molar categories such as race, class, and gender. What I am arguing here is that capacitation around health and attendant registers of bodily prowess, not necessarily identity as trans or disabled or abled or queer or not-trans, ultimately serves as the dividing social practice in biopolitical terms.[66] The debates about the disabled self and the non-disabled other reflect wider discourses of how those selves are materially constructed through the discourses that abound on abject and successful bodies.

While the capacity to piece (in order to pass as not passing) can produce new forms of transnormativity, Stryker and Sullivan rightly point out that bodily comportments that do not strive to manifest wholeness or an investment in the self as coherent do not have to reproduce liberal norms of being: "It is this aspect of bodily being that the liberal discourse of property rights in oneself does not, and cannot, account for; it is this aspect

of bodily being that we seek to highlight when suggesting that individual demands for bodily alteration are also, necessarily, demands for new social bodies—new somatechnologies that ethically refigure the relationship between individual corporealities and aggregate assemblages of bodies."[67] This formulation, then, of new somatechnologies that refuse the individualizing mandate of neoliberal paradigms of bodily capacity and debility in favor of articulating greater connectivities between "aggregate assemblages of bodies" precisely flags the challenge of crafting convivial political praxes. And yet, it is also the case that such political praxes must never occlude the stratifications inherent in the quest to access such somatechnologies. The transnormative body of futurity that reflects neoliberal celebrations of flexibility and piecing remains an elusive reality for many. The distinctions between passing and piecing are thus fluid and shifting, given the kinds of piecing together of medical access and legal accommodations that many, perhaps most, trans of color bodies are forced to seek in any efforts to pass.

BECOMING TRANS? A GEOPOLITICS OF RACIAL ONTOLOGY

> Molecular lines of flight trace out little modifications, they make detours, they sketch out rises and falls, but they are no less precise for all this, they even direct irreversible processes. . . . Many things happen on this second kind of line—becomings, micro-becomings, which don't even have the same rhythm as history. This is why family histories, registrations, commemorations, are so unpleasant, whilst our true changes take place elsewhere—another politics, another time, another individuation. —GILLES DELEUZE, *Dialogues II*

Thus far I have surveyed how biopolitical recognition of disability has installed a version of gender normativity, in this case specifically through the political apparatus of the ADA. I have then outlined forms of bodily exceptionalism that may produce transableist discourses. I turn now from the focus on subject construction—the trans subject(s) and the disabled subject(s) that are hailed and/or denied by legal legitimation, state recognition, public accommodation, and resource distribution—to offer a reconceptualization of corporeal assemblages that foregrounds ontological constellations. It is an approach that highlights how bodies are malleable as composites of parts, affects, compartmentalized capacities and debilities, and as data points and informational substrates. Continuous oscillation between identity, rights-based claims of the subject seeking recognition

and biopolitical control operating largely though securing the sub- and paraindividual capacities of bodies for privatized (in the United States) regimes for pay is presumed. These "poles" of individuation and dividuation, as Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari note, are never without each other: "These two poles are inseparable; they entertain perpetual relations of transformation, conversion, jumping, falling, and rising."[68] The battle against the extraction and exploitation of bodily capacities and habituations is not going to happen through the terrain of intersectional politics alone. Biopolitical control societies work insidiously by using disciplinary power to keep or deflect our attention around the subjection of the subject, thus allowing control to manifest unhindered. As noted earlier, I argue that another interpretation of disciplinary apparatuses is that in part they function as foils for control mechanisms.

Enacting this oscillation moves between questions such as what disability is and what trans is toward what disability does and what trans does. James Overboe develops the Deleuzian notion of the impersonal life—one without a self—to cut through a disability politics of identity that centralizes the self-reflexive individual. He generates this intervention in order to "affirm disabled lives that are simply expressed without cognition, intent, or agency." Overboe writes: "The vitalism of an impersonal life is often considered noise that will be filtered out, in the name of clarity, in order to facilitate the real business of social change and so-called emancipation. This reestablishes and reinscribes the dominant language or communication style associated with being a person or individual with agency."[69] There is a refusal here of the medical impairment versus social construction impasse.[70] This has occurred in part because Deleuzian theory embraces biomateriality, foregrounding vitalism and potentiality of impairment rather than seeking its recontextualization in the social.[71] Overboe also reminds us that the construct of the subject itself—even the disabled subject—is already discursively able-bodied.

One could also point to efforts articulating trans as an ontological force that impels indeterminate movement rather than an identity, or movement between identities, that demands epistemological accountability. Paisley Currah, Lisa Jean Moore, and Susan Stryker explicate the "trans-" (trans-hyphen) in the sociopolitical.[72] Jami Weinstein develops the notion of transgenre.[73] Mel Chen argues that the "simultaneous limitation and promise" of a Body without Organs (BwO) is "precisely that the genitals (or non-genitals) matter, but are not necessarily constrained by

normative gender and sexuality."[74] Chen is pointing to trans as a reordering of what organs signify which genders, or if any organs need to signify genders at all.[75]

Deleuze and Guattari's use of the term "transsexuality" encourages a fluid spectrum of possibility: trans as a motion, as a continuum of intensity that may or may not inform identity.[76] Deleuze and Guattari propose a three-step agenda to destabilize the sign from signification into "significance": one, to locate the sign within its normative frame of interpretation; two, to deconstruct the sign via its deployment through inverse or obverse chains of signification; three, to "try to create new, as yet unknown statements for that proposition, even if the result were a patois of sensual delights, physical and semiotic systems in shreds, asubjective affects, signs without signifiance [*sic*] where syntax, semantics, and logics are in collapse."[77] The third step, then, is a wrenching of the logic of enunciation from expression, from coherence and order. Deleuze diagrams these three steps through the terms "heterosexuality," "homosexuality," and "transsexuality," mapping how on the first two levels "the sexes themselves, however, remained statistical, aggregate or 'molar' . . . (since each individual belongs to either one series or the other at any given time)."[78] As such, Deleuze and Guattari's invocation of "real transsexualities" gestures toward an entity that does not simply hybridize or add to the designations of male and female sex through a third configuration—trans—but actually transcends sex itself, that is, goes beyond the demarcations that make up sex, and more crucially dissembles sex as a master sign, as a taxonomic chain of signifiers.

While earlier I highlighted the troubling discourse of shared transsex in relation to unmarked and uneven biopolitics of toxicity distribution, I return to Kier's formulation of transgender as all-encompassing category—"everyone on the planet is now encompassed within the category of transgender." This claim is suggestive to me not of the desire to retain the category of transgender but, rather, of its imbrication in an unfolding interspecies biopolitical vision. Kier proclaims that "we might be better off responding to this rearrangement, not through fear of the eco-catastrophic assumptions transsex invokes, but by embracing our shared interdependent transsex."[79] Weinstein also mobilizes the notion of becoming as a dismantling of the "very speciation and biopolitical identity construction" that Foucault elaborates.[80] In a critique of species taxonomy, Julie Livingston and I use the term "biopolitical anthropomorphism" or, reworded more

appropriately, "biopolitical anthropocentrism" to "highlight the biopolitical processes that cohere the centrality of the human, and of certain humans; and, the tendency of biopolitical analyses to reinscribe this centrality by taking human species as the primary population upon which cleavages of race and sex occur."[81] Biopolitics, as Foucault describes, is the process by which humans become a species (and in fact specimens) to join all other biological species. This becoming is also the process by which anthropomorphic frames of the human thus take force and are consolidated. Foucault explains in *Security, Territory, Population* that "the dimension in which the population is immersed amongst the other living beings appears and is sanctioned when, for the first time, men are no longer called 'mankind' (*le genre humaine*)" and begin to be called "the human species (*l'espece humaine*)."[82] A paradox occurs: the animalism of humans—"the life of the body and the life of the species"—is taken up as a project of population construction, and humans join species.[83] The (androcentric) human is thus rearticulated as an exceptional form of animality within an anthropomorphized category: humanity. Therefore, although Foucault's own work does not explore the implications of this in terms of interspecies relating, his theory of biopolitics understands anthropocentrism as a defining facet of modernity.

Transgender studies has taken on the question of speciation through a posthumanist or nonhumanist turn. This meeting of transgender studies, animal studies, and posthumanist studies is fantastically rich, considerably complicating humanist presumptions of sex dimorphism and conceptualizing sex as a reaction norm in dynamic emergence with the environment and as an effect of genes and (hormonal) environments interfacing.[84] Myra Hird's work defuses the nature/culture distinction by unpacking the human exceptionalism embedded in continually evoking the trans human body as transgressive of nature. Given its plentitude in nonhuman forms, Hird argues that trans is not a cultural artifact of technological means, or gloriously perverse in that it is unnatural, but is in fact constitutive of nature itself. Hird deploys trans not just beyond or across sex but across "traditional species classifications." Taking a cue from the complexity of intersex and transsex and the nonapplicability of gender and sexual dimorphism to most nonhuman life, Hird argues against a nature/culture binary where the human trans body is understood as a technological invention alone. The upshot of Hird's argument is that trans is not transgressive but, rather and in fact, natural.[85] In concert with Vicky Kirby's proposition that nature is

writing and re-presenting itself, and that perhaps culture has been nature all along, Hird quotes Margulis and Dorion to argue that technology must be understood through its interspecies dimensions: "The use of technology to distinguish between nature and culture obscures the very real and energetic invention and use of technology by nonhuman living organisms . . . as well as the extent to which so-called human technologies actually mimic technology already invented by other species."[86] Hird's argument, which complicates if not refuses the nature/culture bifurcation, has vast implications regarding the biomedical versus social model of disability. Within the context of transgender jurisprudence and activist debates regarding the use of the medical model in legislative battles for health care and attendant provisions, her analysis suggests a strategic deployment of the model might defuse pathological conceptualizations when posited as a manipulation of the terms of technology and what constitutes the natural.

But despite challenging the foregrounding of the human and its centrality to defining the parameters of sex, gender, and sexual reproduction, the deepening conversations between transgender studies, animal studies, and posthumanism have not spurred an enthusiastic engagement with disability studies, a field always in conversation with arrangements of the human, especially as it relates to cognitive, mental, and intellectual disabilities. This occlusion is further notable in light of a rich, emerging dialogue between disability studies and animal studies.[87] Further, the growing partnership between transgender studies and animal studies has been less attentive to discussions of racial difference and biopolitical anthropocentrism, foregrounding instead the category species, as if species were not also a forum for understanding cleavages of racial difference.[88] One effort to redress these elisions is Chen's articulation of the "prefixal trans-"—a materialism of grammar—as a "way to explore that complexity of gender definition that lies between human gender systems and the gendering of animals."[89] In attending to the relationship between human animals and nonhuman animals as a racializing technology of biopolitics, Chen's analysis articulates trans not just as "mutilating gender," as the rescrambling and reorganizing of gender, but trans as mutilating, or perhaps better stated, as mutating race as well.[90] In some cases, this mutating is a reterritorialization and enhanced capacitation of racial privilege and the projection of racial coherence through rearranging gender. Bobby Jean Noble, for example, describes his process of regeneration from a working-class butch woman to a trans man as one of moving from "formerly off-white [to a] now White person" in a landscape

wherein "the 'self' is the hottest and most insidious capitalist commodity."[91] The confusing designation of "off-white" notwithstanding, Noble describes this capacitation of race—a revival of the privileges of whiteness now afforded through masculinity—as a by-product of trans body modification. If one queries this derivative formulation, however, the possibility that mutilating gender might not be so easily cleaved from (desires for?) racial recuperation or from constructs of ableism needs to be considered. What kinds of attempted recuperation of one sort or another subtend or even preface these rearrangements of gender?

Recall that for Foucault racism is not derivative of biopower but, rather, a prerequisite for how biopolitics works; that is to say, Foucault wrenches racism out of notions of cultural tolerance by stating that the caesura in the biological spectrum that is accorded to race is necessary for licensing the four coordinates of biopolitical will: making live, making die, letting live, letting die. This formulation of racism as a "caesura in the biological domain" can be mobilized as a preemptive critique of a posthumanism that does not acknowledge race as a critical threshold of demarcation.[92] Given the centrality of racial demarcatedness to biopolitics, I read Foucault's expounding of apparatuses of security, later recapitulated and torqued in Deleuze's theorization of control societies, as in fact the *geopolitics of racial ontology*.

Resuturing the foundational function of race within biopolitics to the production of ontologically irreducible entities in control societies, the geopolitics of racial ontology marks the manifestation of different spatializing regimes of the body, and its particles, such that the biological caesura that demarcates the cut of or for racism is now not just a question of visible racial difference or of the taxonomic and eugenic science of phrenology and the scientific racism of the eighteenth century through the early twentieth century. It is also driven by biotechnologies of genetic engineering, assisted reproductive technologies, human genome sequencing, and phenotypical variation—which intersect with and appear as gendered transformations. The "cut" of racism is not made only through disciplinary categories of race but, more perniciously, through biopolitical control aggregates of population.[93] This geopolitics of racial ontology destabilizes the relentless focus on epistemological correctives that tend to dominate political interventions. But, more trenchantly, the emphasis on geopolitics amends what might otherwise be a locationless notion of ontology. The unmarked locational investment of recent work on ontology thus discounts

the productive force of geopolitics within its scholarly purview as well as disavows the geopolitical forces that enable theorizing.

In the oscillation between discipline and control, which is less about the end of disciplining and more about the constellation of relations between discipline and control, the question, are you trans? morphs to, how trans are you? Both discipline and control pivot on the fantasy of a body that is concretely and distinctly a real trans body—the (transnormative?) body that pieces—manifest in opposition to the body that is most certainly cisgender. Similarly, the question, are you disabled? morphs to, how abled are you? and how disabled are you? In the context of an array of medical procedures that change in terms of access, signification, cultural capital, and socialization, the moves around these questions are not signaling merely degree. The end goal—to pass? to piece?—is impossible and always shifting: there is no trans. Trans becoming masquerades as a teleological movement, as if one could actually become trans. Trans is often mistaken as the horizon of trans and, as such, is mistaken for becoming trans as linear telos, as a prognosis that becomes the body's contemporary diagnosis and domesticates the trans body into the regulatory norms of permanence.[94]

Becoming trans, then, as opposed to trans becoming, must highlight this impossibility of linearity, permanence, and end points. In Deleuzian terms, becoming is the "I" cascading into the impersonal, the stripping of all registers of signification that make each body succumb to subjectification over "signifiance." Becoming, as Weinstein contends, is a "wholesale deterritorialization of the human" and a "becoming imperceptible"—a divestment of codes, of signification, of identity and a process of taking on the register of the impersonal.[95] Becoming is not about trying to make the body more capacitated but about allowing and reading more multiplicity, multiplicities of the impersonal and of the imperceptible. Importantly, becomings have no static referent of start point, end point, or climax; they have no narrative. Becoming is awash in pure immanence, never coincident with itself, marked only by degrees of intensity and duration.[96] But none of this is to obscure the fact that becoming has become a zone for profit for contemporary capitalism, for neoliberal piecing and profiteering, a mode through which profit is being aggressively produced. And, as such, all theorizations of becoming are generated through and within the geopolitics of racial ontology that it inhabits.

As trans transition is increasingly theorized as the mobilization, modulation, and modification of bodily matter rather than a retroactive cutting and severing from being in the wrong body, control societies must be understood as deeply sympathetic to if not partially productive of this reframing. Control mines gradations of surface and depth, tension and attention, penetration and withdrawal, finding multiple uses for the diversification of vestments and investments. Once again, however, we can de-exceptionalize trans bodies, as they are neither exceptionally susceptible to control and its forms of continuous surveillance (given the continuities between rhinoplasty and trans surgical procedures, for example, and body modification in general), nor exceptionally capable of modulation, flexibility, and attunement.[97]

Biopolitical control foregrounds the subindividual capacities, the nonhuman capacities, the prosthetic capacities, the molecular capacities, the hormonal capacities, manipulating the telos of degree granting driven by the medical-industrial complex. Paul Preciado develops a formulation of the "pharmaco-pornographic" to describe the proliferation of bodily modulations in control societies, forms of "soft technologies" that "enter the body to form part of it: they dissolve in the body; they become the body": "Here the body no longer inhabits disciplinary spaces, but is inhabited by them. The bio-molecular and organic structure of the body is a last resort for these control systems."[98] The disciplinary spaces Preciado writes of—encompassing the molar categories of race, gender, sex—proliferate from bodily habitations of identity to *in*habitations of the body. This inhabitation is perhaps one of the most pernicious modalities of power that control can manifest—control as discipline par excellence, in that discipline reproduces itself continuously throughout time and space. These "micro-prosthetics" of control, which Preciado claims impel "a process of miniaturization," "take the form of the body; they control by transforming into 'body,' until they become inseparable and indistinguishable from it."[99] Thus, the term "body modification" becomes a redundancy: the body is (endless) modification. This body, however, is not only the contoured organic body with a race and a sex; it is composites of information that splay the body across registers of disciplinary space and time. The target is data, not only identity or the subject or its representation. Communities of belonging—traditionally understood through disciplinary categories of identity, spatiality, coherence—are reorganized through statistical

populations, stratified through aggregates of biopolitical life chances in the nexus where state, market, scientific, and geopolitical realms meet.

While I find Preciado's description of control economies of bodily inhabitation very persuasive, they optimistically describe the molecular as the "paradoxical condition of contemporary resistance and revolt": "We are molecularly equipped to remain complicit with dominant repressive formations. But the contemporary pharmaco-pornographic body . . . is *not* docile. This body is not simply an effect of the pharmaco-pornographic systems of control; it is first and above all the materialization of . . . 'power of life' that aspires to transfer to all and to every body. This is the paradoxical condition of contemporary resistance and revolt: pharmaco-pornographic subjectivity is at the same time the effect of biopolitical technologies of control and the ultimate site of resistance to them."[100]

We might want to pause at the formulation of the molecular and the non-docile body within which it resides as "the ultimate site of resistance." This statement assumes an ontologizing of the molecular as a thriving site of resistance by virtue of its mere presence and flexible relation to biomedical control economies (indeed, part of the transnormative body that pieces, thus driving the reterritorialization of whiteness). The geopolitics of racial ontology condition any possibilities for becoming, for a wholesale deterritorialization of the human. Given that all coordinates of the medical model, the social model, access to subject recognition, and the medical-industrial complex revolve around not just gender and sexual alterity, but also racial alterity and disenfranchisement through racial difference, I propose that *becoming trans* is a capacitation of race, of racial ontologies, that informs the functioning of geo- and biopolitical control. Becoming trans is a process that not only courts the transformation of bodies in terms of gender but also solicits the capacity of race to reinvent its terms. Race here is understood not only as a function or synonym of color/identity/social construction but also, and perhaps more perniciously, as speciation. Becoming trans is distinct from trans being, or trans normativity that revels in the futurity of the body that pieces, because it specifically and deliberately acknowledges a political commitment to thinking through the forms of racial capacitation and reterritorialization that subtend and inform trans movements.

We could see becoming trans, then, as the dissolution of this category of signification through manifesting the intensive multiplicity of race, outpacing the forces of signification that seek to contain and compartmentalize what is raced, what is not raced. Insofar as *race* continues to be defined in relation to the White Man who sets its parameters, what Amit Rai calls "race racing" proliferates racial ontologies that are irreducible and unto themselves, in relation through infinite variation rather than difference from (the White Man). The impetus for race racing stems, for Rai, from the context of antiracist organizing in Britain, where he laments the continual reiteration of the centrality and normativity of white subjects and bodies in even the most progressive antiracist political forums. On thinking race not representationally but intensively, what he calls race racing, Rai writes:

> If one is to consistently think race racing as an intensive process, the multiplicity of race lacks any resemblance to itself; race racing multiplicities give form to processes, not to this or that final product (a race, a name . . .). Indeed, the end results of processes realizing the same multiplicity may be highly dissimilar from each other, like the spherical soap bubble and the cubic salt crystal, or like Jazz music and the narrative novel, "which not only do not resemble one another, but bear no similarity to the topological point guiding their production." The multiplicity of race racing is of an obscure yet distinct nature quite different from the clear and distinct identity of rationalistic essences.[101]

Race racing, as Rai elaborates, tracks the insistent becoming of race, the way race—"lack[ing] any resemblance to itself"—is always mutilating and mutating (to invoke the language from mutilating gender) its form in order to resituate and revive its capacitation within biopolitical fields. Race racing, then, allows a reading of racial capacitation—deterritorialization, reterritorialization—in becoming trans. Becoming trans is of course just one potentiality of race racing. But if we are serious, to invoke Chen and others who think of trans as a movement not tethered to modulations and modifications solely of gender and sexuality but also of species, race racing changes trans becoming insofar as it potentially changes what race is, proliferates its intensive, singular forms, reorganizes its registers of significance and signification, and reterritorializes and multiplies its capacitation, its presence, its mutability. But becoming trans also carries through and out a process of racialization as much as it also marks an intensive race racing, a moment of race-becoming futurity. There is no doubt that the reterritorialization of whiteness, in particular of white masculinities, might occur through the reassembling of gender and sexuality into versions of

transnormativity. But becoming trans as a practice and a politics takes on a deterritorializing force not only in relation to gender and sex but also in relation to race and speciation. The question, then, is not, does gender and sex nonnormativity lead to racial nonnormativity? but, rather, what are the creative lines of flight that mutate and distort and swerve in Lucretian fashion? Not swerve from, just swerve, creating intensive rather than qualified difference. Thinking of becoming trans as a form of race racing illuminates the relations of white transnormative (FTM) bodies of futurity—the ones that pass by exemplifying piecing—to the TransJustice (MTF) bodies of color, those that struggle to piece (in order to perhaps pass), by seeing all these bodies as implicated in the redistribution of capacitations and reterritorializations of race in their intensive differences. The multiplicity, not the either/or of normativity or nonnormativity, of racial and gender difference is foregrounded. Thus, passing and piecing would be destabilized from their discrete sexual and racial referents and understood, rather, as produced through interfacing assemblages of de- and reterritorialization, of proliferating not only genders but also races and, indeed, species.

A deconstructive model of race insistently repositions the white male subject as determinant of what race is, of making sense or different sense of a representational format or forum; language dominates the political realm here.[102] But theorists such as Arun Saldanha and Amit Rai are arguing for a political and theoretical methodology that intensifies and proliferates race rather than deconstructs it. This proliferation, rather than hoping to dissolve binaries, makes them fade through the overwhelming force of ontological multiplicity, attuned to the perpetual differentiation of variation to variation, of difference within rather than between, and the multiplicity of affirmative becomings: the becoming otherwise of difference, whereby language is resituated as just one potential platform of the political. It is attuned to soliciting sense, rather than making sense (of) or inciting discourse. Seeking the creation of potentialities of emergence, this methodology is less invested in a reinvestment of form and more attuned to the perpetual differentiation of becomings.[103] If race is a technology of regeneration, in that race is insistently reinventing itself in manners both "obscure" and "distinct," as Rai avers, this methodology doggedly pursues the inventive movements of race itself. Writing that "race is a whole event," Saldanha exhorts: "Every time phenotype makes another machinic connection, there is a stutter. Every time bodies are further entrenched in segregation, however brutal, there needs to be an affective investment of some

sort. This is the ruptural moment in which to intervene. Race should not be eliminated, but *proliferated*, its many energies directed at multiplying racial differences so as to render them joyfully cacophonic."[104]

This joyful cacophony resonates with what Rai understands as "an experimentation on race itself," one that would "continuously mutate, never resembling itself, changing the metric of its own measure through a resonance that moves beyond its terms."[105] Unlike Preciado, for whom resistance is simply a priori installed in the molecular as the "ultimate site of resistance" and utterly unbeholden to any collective—an ontologizing and individuating politics at best, as Jord/ana Rosenberg so deftly demonstrates—Rai calls for social and political practices of experimentation, a deeply pragmatic manipulation of the partitioning capacities of bodies.[106] I suggest this "[move] beyond its terms" is one way of working through and also against how biopolitical control seeks to modulate sub- and paraindividual capacities of the body. Control seeks to modulate the impersonal, the becoming, all while promoting an individual recourse to subject identification. Becoming trans, as suggested by race racing, would be a politics of manifesting beyond what control can control, a molecular line of flight, a moment of intensification in the process of becoming that is characteristic of race racing. As with all becomings, lines of flight are immanent. As such their availability for reterritorialization and capacity to newly territorialize is imminent. The revolution is not molecular; rather, movement resides in the interstitial shuttling—"the ruptural moment in which to intervene"—between intensive multiplicity and its most likely recapture.